By Clara Marcelli.

Introduction

In September, the eagerly awaited Ivorian regional and municipal elections provided an interesting snapshot of the political climate of a country often marked by electoral violence. The Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), the ruling party, emerged as the clear victor, positioning itself as a major force just two years ahead of the presidential elections _^[1]. President Alassane Ouattara, who has been in power since 2011, now appears to have a strong chance of securing a fourth term. He is, however, unclear about his running intentions, and the list of potential successors keeps growing. One thing remains certain: regardless of the result, many Ivorians wonder what France will think of the election results, and whether or not the French government will try to meddle in Ivorian politics. Interviewed two years ago, Ivorian historian Simi Deroux emphasised that “it seems almost impossible for a leader to reach the supreme magistracy or to stay in power if he is not endorsed by France” _^[2]. The country has indeed been known to interfere a lot in the affairs of its former colony, ever since its independence in 1960, notably playing a decisive role in the fall of President Laurent Gbagbo and the rise to power of Allassane Ouatara _^[3]. Therefore, while the excellent relations between the current French and Ivorian presidents _^[4] point to a healthy and resilient partnership, there are challenges to address for this bilateral relationship to prosper in this post-independence era.

Challenges

France’s controversial military actions in Côte d’Ivoire

France’s controversial actions have tarnished its legacy in Côte d’Ivoire, especially after the First Ivorian Civil War. In 2002, a group of armed rebels attempted to seize the north of the country and overthrow democratically elected President Laurent Gbagbo. He invoked a 1961 defence agreement with France _^[5], who launched Operation Licorne, ostensibly for humanitarian purposes. However, the intervention’s true motives remain shrouded in ambiguity, with many suspecting a hidden agenda to oust Gbagbo’s regime. After all, French President Jacques Chirac had considered doing it two years earlier _^[6]. The conflict dragged on and in November 2004, the French military camp at Bouaké was bombed during an Ivorian offensive against the rebels. Was it a calculated offensive, an unintended mishap or a meticulously planned ploy _^[7]? Regardless, the French army retaliated by destroying the Ivorian air fleet and opened fire a few days later on an unarmed crowd of anti-French demonstrators in Abidjan. This event marked a turning point in the Franco-Ivorian crisis _^[8]. Its final act occured seven years later, during the 2011 Presidential elections. With Laurent Gbagbo refusing to cede power to opponent Alassane Ouattara, the French army intervened under UN mandate and launched an assault on the presidential residence _^[9]. Gbagbo was put on trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. In 2021, after nearly ten years in detention, he was acquitted of all charges _^[10]. A trial was held in the meantime to investigate the bombing of Bouaké, but still, no judicial inquiry has been launched to shed light on the French shootings of civilians _^[11].

In 2012, France and Côte d’Ivoire forged a robust defence partnership based on non-interference _^[12] and are engaged in a strategic dialogue today to rearticulate the French military presence in the region _^[13]. As part of his new roadmap for Africa, President Macron has announced the imminent downsizing of the Abidjan base and the future co-management of these not de facto ‘military bases’ with partner countries _^[14].  This shift acknowledges France’s recent setbacks in the Sahel area and reflects the growing African scepticism towards its military presence, prompting a search for alternative partnerships, even in counterterrorism _^[15]. France’s fading influence on the continent is being skilfully exploited by countries such as China, Turkey, and Russia, whom Emmanuel Macron accused of spreading anti-French propaganda in Africa _^[16]. The Russian Wagner group has destabilised the region and replaced France as the main foreign security force in the former colony of the Central African Republic _^[17], and now wants to expand its military influence into new countries, including Côte d’Ivoire _^[18].

French-Ivorian economic relations in the face of new competition

In addition to its military activities, Wagner has opened up an economic front and started exploiting Africa’s vast natural resources _^[19]. Despite the strong historic economic relationship between France and Côte d’Ivoire, new players in West Africa are challenging France’s dominant economic relationship with its former colony. In addition to Russia, China emerges as an obvious competitor _^[20], but we can also mention Turkey _^[21] and the Gulf States _^[22]. Besides exploiting anti-French resentment, foreign contenders also offer attractive commercial deals. Côte d’Ivoire chose Italian partner ENI to exploit their newly discovered oil and gas field ‘Baleine’. While ENI currently holds a 90% stake in the blocks where the field extends, the Ivorian state will receive 52% of the net profits after amortisation of investments _^[23]. Most notably, China’s economic collaboration with Côte d’Ivoire is highly visible. The construction sites operated by Chinese labour and the resulting infrastructures are tangible manifestations of its presence _^[24]. France invests more than China in Côte d’Ivoire but it has less economic visibility and tends to be perceived less as a catalyst for growth and development.  Alassane Ouattara recently lashed out at the “moralising” Europeans, incensed by the prospect of a European law blocking Ivorian cocoa imports due to deforestation concerns _^[25].

A major point of contention in economic relations is the continued existence of the African Financial Community (CFA) franc monetary zone. Opponents denounce an outdated economic system that shackles the fourteen CFA countries to the eurozone’s monetary policies, imposing fiscal restraint, constricting macroeconomic options, and granting them access to only 30% of their own foreign currency reserves _^[26]. Presidents Ouattara and Macron announced in 2019 the replacement of the CFA franc by the ECO, a single regional currency designed to unify West Africa _^[27]. While the project is still at a standstill _^[28], experts denounce a superficial rebranding of the CFA Franc _^[29]. Today, the emancipation of young people in Côte d’Ivoire, and more generally in Africa, is breaking free from post-independence loyalties and demands diplomatic relations based on equality and built on actions rather than declarations.

Recommendations

Strengthening Ivorian sovereignty: a call for greater responsibility

Despite these historical legacies and regional setbacks, the ties between Côte d’Ivoire and France remain strong and offer fertile ground for strengthening their long-standing cooperation. Emmanuel Macron declared earlier this year that the age of Françafrique is well over, referring to the strategic support of authoritarian leaders to defend French interests _^[30]. Be as it may, their power to act as such in the past was unquestionably fertilised by the lack of due diligence and foresight of Ivorian leaders, who bear some responsibility. In 2000, nothing prevented Laurent Gbagbo from prioritising  his country’s security and preparing the nation to overcome any contingency _^[31]. While Côte d’Ivoire stands proudly as a sovereign nation, some of its own leaders inadvertently undermine that very sovereignty by fostering an exaggerated perception of Parisian influence. After he publicly thanked France for its support after the 2010 presidential election, President Ouattara swiftly reasserted Ivorian sovereignty when those same powers dared to intervene in 2015 regarding his potential third term _^[31]. Ivorian politicians and elites can significantly curtail France’s room for manoeuvring by fostering robust institutions and prioritising national interest over political differences.

Moving beyond French paternalism

While not expressed openly in Côte d’Ivoire _^[32], anti-French sentiments are extremely present in West Africa, a region with complex issues where France’s central political and economic presence make it the perfect scapegoat _^[33]. France inadvertently fuels speculation about ulterior motives by claiming a special responsibility in the region. In an attempt to cultivate renewed ties with Africa, President Macron advocated for debt relief for Africa _^[34] and organised a dialogue at the 2021 Africa-France summit in Montpellier _^[35]. However, these efforts are starkly contradicted by restrictive visa and migration policies implemented by France and the European Union _^[36], leading to accusations of exploitative intent under the guise of altruism and contributing to calls for alternative partnerships _^[37]. France is no longer the power it was in 1960 and must today redefine its state-to-state relations in the light of this cold reality.

Bridging cultures and boosting economies: a new era of Franco-Ivorian partnership

The countries’ interlinked communities present a fertile ground for future bilateral relations. The dynamic Ivorian diaspora in France, demonstrably favouring it over all other OECD countries, offers a unique bridge between the two nations ^_[38]. In Côte d’Ivoire, the vibrant network of French and dual citizens, along with a robust presence of French businesses, also paves the way for deeper engagement ^_[39]. Cultural ties remain extremely strong, and both countries can mobilise the sports and music industries to bring their respective youths closer through shared visions and aspirations. The two ministers of Economy and Finance could leverage Franco-Ivorian companies to provide more substantial training to Ivorian youth, and scholarship policies can be revitalised and expanded towards the most promising segments. Côte d’Ivoire is already the 8th country in terms of the number of students in France, an increase of 80% compared to 2012 ^_[40]. This must, however, concur with efforts to retain Ivorian local talent and even attract foreign talent.

Regarding monetary cooperation, the CFA franc will not necessarily mark the downfall of the bilateral relationship. To some extent, the currency enables Côte d’Ivoire to maintain a stable economy and pursue economic growth ^_[41], reaching 6.7% in 2022 ^_[42]. Côte d’Ivoire’s economy remains predominantly linked to raw materials like cocoa, coffee or cotton. Still, it has diversified significantly into sectors such as its agro-industry, making it one of the most robust in West Africa ^_[43]. Even if the mechanisms behind this currency remain quite vague and its neo-colonialist character is discreditable, it cannot be considered as the main obstacle to the economic development of French-speaking countries. Otherwise, a state like Guinea Conakry would be moving forward, but is instead regularly facing currency shortages ^_[44]. Ghana, another West African country that is not part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), is currently facing its biggest financial crisis with an inflation exceeding 40% ^_[45].

Technical cooperation could become another strong pillar of the Franco-Ivorian forward-looking relationship. In the 1990s, French technical cooperation collapsed with several West African countries, creating a vacancy that Russian, Turkish, and Chinese competitors filled _^[46]. Today, France can put forward its scientific expertise to nurture innovation ecosystems in Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, the dynamic and rejuvenated Ivorian fabric economy, driven by creating innovative companies that engage with SMEs and the tech sector in France, can call for a future cooperative relationship _^[47]. By harnessing all these strengths and strengthening a mutually equally beneficial relationship, France and Côte d’Ivoire have the potential to elevate their existing partnership and bilateral cooperation framework to new heights.

Edited by Justine Peries.

References

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[Cover image] Picture of “Drapeau ivoirien au couché du soleil dans la commune de Koumassi” by BorisAhonon licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International