By Lorenzo Cappelletti.
Gaza’s Lifeline
“Egypt rejects any attempt to resolve the Palestinian issue by military means or through the forced displacement of Palestinians from their land, which would come at the expense of the countries of the region” [1]. On October 18, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi stated his position, still firm to this day: Gazans will not be allowed to cross the Rafah Border. The latter, referred to as Gaza’s Lifeline, represents the only way out of war for 2 million Palestinians.
(Photo by: Gaza border crossing, Licensed by: GZERO media)
The Gaza-Israel barrier, formed by a fence surrounding the strip of land, holds two access routes. On the junction of the Israel-Egypt-Gaza border, Kerem Shalom Crossing is commonly used as an exchange point for goods. For instance, all fuel for the Palestinian Ione power plant passed through this saddle.
Erez crossing, instead, is the only gateway to Israel for Palestinians. Almost 20 thousand Gazans were allowed to cross its terminal daily thanks to work permits in the Israeli territory [2]. Following the attacks of October 7, Israel shut down both accesses, leaving Gaza’s population trapped in a battleground with limited water, food, and power [3]. In addition, both airspace and territorial water are controlled by Israël [4].
Rafah Crossing, on the Egypt border, has been regarded from the outset as the only source of salvation for Palestinians by many occidental leaders, with discussions headed by the U.S. for the possibility of creating a human corridor [5]. Western countries’ pressure, beyond the humanitarian concern, carries the political interest to avoid a carnage of civilians sprung from a war they publicly support. After a week of diplomacy by various mediators (including U.S. President Joe Biden and U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres), on October 21, President Al-Sisi opened the gateway to let the first 20 trucks of aid into Gaza. Since then, hundreds of vehicles have supplied civilians [6]. Egypt is gradually evacuating foreign passport holders, including Palestinian dual nationals [7]; however, a mass humanitarian corridor for the rest of Palestinians, will not be established. According to Al-Sisi, “what is happening in Gaza is an attempt to force civilian residents to take refugee and migrate to Egypt, which should not be accepted.” [8]
Behind Egypt’s position
To the untrained eye, Egypt’s stance on Rafah Crossing may seem self-contradictory. The Egyptian government issued a statement that warned of “dire dangers of the ongoing escalation between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, following a series of attacks against Palestinian cities.” Hamas’s incursion into Israel, murders of civilians, and hostage-taking were not mentioned. Cairo’s declaration aligns with those of other Arab countries, placing blame for violence on Israel [9] [10]. Furthermore, al-Sisi referred to Palestinian’s situation as “the cause of all causes, the cause of all Arabs”. [11]
Why is Egypt sympathizing with Gazans while refusing to create an escape route for two million civilians? The common denominator of the multiple possible answers to this question lies in the domestic already complex situation in Egypt, and the uncertainty of future developments. It is unclear whether following the eradication of Hamas, Palestinians would be allowed by Israel to come back into the strip. The permanent displacement of the two million people would be problematic in many respects, which we will see in the coming sections.
Egypt’s condition
Firstly, the country’s internal situation needs to be taken into consideration. Most likely, Egypt is the worst-performing economy in the region. The country, highly import-dependent, was heavily destabilized by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Compared to other North African countries, the cost of prices’ increase was significantly higher [12]. Annual inflation hit 39.7% in August.
(Photo by: Riccardo Fabiani, Licensed by: ISPI Istituto per gli studi di Politica Internazionale)
30% of Egyptians live below the poverty line, with another 30% considered vulnerable to falling into poverty. Also, during the last ten years debt has tripled, rising to a record high of $165.4 billion, further impoverishing the country [13]. Several rounds of currency devaluation and an incoming mandated International Monetary Fund bailout gave the coup de grace.
While trying to manage the Israel-Palestine crisis, with a falling apart economy, al-Sisi needed to safeguard short-term political interests as the presidential elections occurred on December 10th, 2023. For the first time since Sisi’s advance, it seemed that he could have faced a credible opposition. Ahmed Tantawi’s campaign, highly critical of the president, was gaining momentum with support from left-wingers and secularists. The candidate for Civil Democratic Movement, however, withdrew its candidacy because of pro-government thugs’ interference. Al-Sisi was thus able to get 89.6% of preferences, securing his third term [14]. Nonetheless, Tantawi’s popularity represents a major structural shift in the country’s politics.
Taking risks, during these tough times can be considered unconscious and not strategic for Al-Sisi. The Rafah Crossing opening could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. Aligning positions with other Arab countries and avoiding issues in Sinai, instead, seems a wise political choice.
Fear of a permanent displacement
With the opening of Rafah Crossing, Al-Sisi fears Israel will take advantage of the displacement and wreck Palestinian demands for statehood in Gaza. Israel could permanently occupy the strip and push the burden of a refugee crisis into Egypt [15]. Egypt strongly countered a debacle, advocating the two-state solution as the only means to ensure long-term peace and stability in the region [16].
All historical precedent–according to senior associate fellow at Carnegie Endowment– points to the fact that when Palestinians are forced to leave the territory, they are not allowed to come back.
A large number of the descendants of the Palestinians who fled during the 1948 war still live in refugee camps in neighboring countries and in Gaza, which was part of the Egyptian territory at the time.
Palestinians in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon
Furthermore, worrying rumblings come from other countries’ experiences following the entrance of Palestinians on their territories. Syria, Jordan and Lebanon all had issues with the newcomers.
Primarily, we need to introduce a new character.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a political and paramilitary organization that was established in 1964 with the goal of representing the Palestinian people in their quest for self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
After the Nabka, 760.000 Palestinians fled, mostly in Syria and Jordan. Following its creation, the PLO movement emerged also in these countries. Tension between the organization and the Syrian government led to its expulsion in 1983 [17]. In Jordan, PLO and its armed wing, Fatah, were accused of challenging the authority of the government and attempting to establish a parallel state [18]. In what became known as “Black September,” in 1970 the Jordan military launched a series of offensives against Palestinians militants. The PLO and other Palestinian factions were permanently expelled from Jordan.
This resulted in a significant Palestinian diaspora, with many refugees relocating to Lebanon. Once again, in this new territory, Palestinians’ presence played a role in the complex dynamics of the Lebanese civil war, with various factions engaged in the conflict. Thus, recent historical developments can be deemed as dissuasive elements for President al-Sisi to open up the Rafah border.
A crucial piece
All paths, at this stage, lead to a disaster scenario. Despite having ordered the evacuation southwards, Israel is deploying warplanes to hit sites near Rafah Crossing. Furthermore, population’s distribution complicates the matter as 85% of the strip’s population was pushed near the gateway.
Gaza was already one of the densest areas of the world before the conflict. Now, the Palestinians will be crammed in an even smaller piece of land, crushed on each other against the Egypt border with limited water, food, and power and bombs flying overhead.
Rafah crossing represents a crucial piece of the puzzle. The importance of the only non-Israeli border of the strip is self-evident. To this day, however, Al-Sisi’s position doesn’t seem to be negotiable. Will the pressure of the unfolded humanitarian crisis undermine Egypt’s stance?
Edited by Justine Peries.
References
[1] Abdallah, Nayera, et al. “Egypt’s Sisi rejects transfer of Gazans, discusses aid with Biden.” Reuters, 18 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/egypt-rejects-any-displacement-palestinians-into-sinai-says-sisi-2023-10-18/. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[2] Horovitz, David. “The sole avenue of coexistence that became a Hamas killing field.” The Times of Israel, 23 November 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-sole-avenue-of-coexistence-that-became-a-hamas-killing-field/. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[3] Alouf, Rushdi Abu. “Gaza ‘soon without fuel, medicine and food’ – Israel authorities.” BBC, 9 October 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67051292. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[4] “What is the Gaza Strip, and who controls it?” CNBC, 17 October 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/17/what-is-the-gaza-strip-and-who-controls-it.html. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[5] Malsin, Jared, and Anas Baba. “Egypt Faces Pressure to Open Border to Refugees From Gaza.” The Wall Street Journal, 11 October 2023, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-gaza/card/egypt-faces-pressure-to-open-border-to-refugees-from-gaza-oXJHgc1ZN1cli2yWdsHp. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[6] “Around 520 trucks of aid have entered Gaza Strip from Egypt since war began.” Deccan Herald, 7 November 2023, https://www.deccanherald.com/world/around-520-trucks-of-aid-have-entered-gaza-strip-from-egypt-since-war-began-2761531. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[7] “Photos: Hundreds of foreign passport holders leave Gaza for Egypt.” Al Jazeera, 7 November 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/11/7/palestinians-wait-at-rafah-crossing-as-evacuation-to-egypt-continues. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[8] Abdallah, Nayera, et al. “Egypt’s Sisi rejects transfer of Gazans, discusses aid with Biden.” Reuters, 18 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/egypt-rejects-any-displacement-palestinians-into-sinai-says-sisi-2023-10-18/. Accessed 24 December 2023.
[9] Khalil, Sarah, and William Christou. “How did Arab states react to Hamas attack on Israel?” The New Arab, 7 October 2023, https://www.newarab.com/news/how-did-arab-states-react-hamas-attack-israel. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[10] “Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran say Israel has only itself to blame for Hamas attacks.” The Hill, 7 October 2023, https://thehill.com/policy/international/4243388-saudi-arabia-qatar-iran-blame-israel-hamas-attacks/. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[11] Al-Khalidi, Suleiman, and Maya Gebeily. “Arab states say Palestinians must stay on their land as war escalates.” Reuters, 14 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-states-say-palestinians-must-stay-their-land-war-escalates-2023-10-13/. Accessed 24 December 2023.
[12] Fabiani, Riccardo. “The Ukraine war’s economic impact on North Africa.” ISPI, 14 June 2023, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-ukraine-wars-economic-impact-on-north-africa-winners-losers-and-a-dangerous-lack-of-long-term-vision-132037. Accessed 18 December 2023.
[13] “Egypt annual inflation at record 36.8% in June.” Al-Monitor, 10 July 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/07/egypt-annual-inflation-record-368-june. Accessed 24 December 2023.
[14] Saafan, Farah, and Aidan Lewis. “Egypt’s Sisi sweeps to third term as president with 89.6% of vote.” Reuters, 19 December 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/results-due-egypt-election-with-sisi-expected-sweep-third-term-2023-12-18/. Accessed 24 December 2023.
[15] Gbadamosi, Nosmot. “Why Egypt Won’t Open Its Border With Gaza.” Foreign Policy, 18 October 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/18/egypt-hamas-israel-border-gaza/. Accessed 19 December 2023.
[16] al-Omari, Ghaith, and David Schenker. “Why Egypt Won’t Open the Border to Its Palestinian Neighbors.” The Washington Institute, 24 October 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/why-egypt-wont-open-border-its-palestinian-neighbors. Accessed 19 December 2023.
[17] Jonathan C. “Syria Abruptly Ousts Arafat As PLO Rebellion Mounts.” Washington Post, 25 June 1983, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/06/25/syria-abruptly-ousts-arafat-as-plo-rebellion-mounts/9d72332b-b76a-4b5c-83d8-d737f5dbaa28/. Accessed 24 December 2023.
[18] “Chronology for Palestinians in Jordan.” Refworld, https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38aa1e.html. Accessed 24 December 2023.
[19] Saleh, Heba. “’Catastrophic’ conditions in Rafah as Palestinians reach the end of the line.” Financial Times, 10 December 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/5e2b06cf-9ee4-473e-8bd8-bd0ff9d454a4. Accessed 23 December 2023.
[Cover Image] Photo by: Mohammed Abubakr, licensed by: Pexels



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