By Louis Brugel.
Denmark went from being a traditionally cautious Member State towards EU defense integration to joining the Permanent Structured Cooperation. What happened?
What is the Permanent Structured Cooperation?
In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO or CSP) [1]. Its objective is to allow European Union Member States to collaborate on Defence-related matters.
This disposition was activated by a group of 25 Member States in 2017 [2]. PESCO relies on the principle of differentiated integration or multi-speed Europe that enables Member States to integrate at different levels and paces [3]. In other words, not all EU Member States are required to join PESCO.
PESCO enables a group of Member States to commit to increasing and coordinating their defence spending, participating in common armament programs, and reinforcing the operational capabilities of their armies together. To this day, PESCO-participating countries have created more than 60 projects spanning from cybersecurity, training facilities, and maritime to air systems [4].
This framework should have entered into force as early as 2010, but the lack of willingness in Paris, Berlin, and London halted the project [5]. Nonetheless, the evolution of the geopolitical context in the 2010s with the civil wars in Libya and Syria, the emergence of ISIS, the annexation of Crimea, Brexit, and Trump’s election was a wake-up call for the EU [5][6]. In 2017, European leaders agreed to launch PESCO to improve security and defence in Europe. At that time, only two countries decided not to join: Malta and Denmark [7].
Ukraine invasion: a wake-up call
In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, various European countries started to review their positioning in defence frameworks. Among them were Finland and Sweden, which applied for membership to NATO in May 2022, but also Denmark, which decided to reconsider its opt-out from the EU’s Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) [8]. In fact, since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, Denmark opted-out of several EU policies such as police and justice, the euro, and defence [9]. In 2022, 66.87% of Danes voted to opt-in to the EU defence policy, while the national parliament agreed to increase the defence budget up to 2% by 2033 [10].
Moreover, Denmark’s security threat relies not only on Eastern Europe with Ukraine and the Baltics but also on the Arctic via Greenland. Greenland is an autonomous territory of Denmark; the issue here is that Russia is developing an ambitious policy for the North Pole via militarising of its Arctic borders, thus creating security concerns for countries in the region [11][12].
The consequences of Denmark’s opt-in
By rejoining the EU’s defence policy, Copenhaguen can now get involved in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in the anti-piracy mission near the coast of Somalia [8]. Moreover, the country can participate in developing military capacities within EU schemes. It is essential to mention that the CSDP that Danes voted to join differs from PESCO. Indeed, the CSDP aims to develop the EU’s capabilities in terms of crisis management and prevention of conflicts [13]. On the other hand, PESCO is an opportunity for Member States to collaborate further and integrate. Denmark’s entry into PESCO after it voted to join the CSDP was, therefore, a significant milestone when one knows that the country normally views the EU as a mainly economic union. The Danes have traditionally been one of the most sceptical nations regarding European integration [14]. The fact that the population decided to review its position on EU defence policies shows a paradigm change caused by the war in Ukraine. In fact, Denmark is a small country that understands that it cannot ensure the preservation of its national security without cooperation on innovation, and industry. Copenhaguen, therefore, places much importance on fostering ties with SMEs, research centres, and suppliers within EU frameworks [15].
Some argue that Denmark’s entry into PESCO, and more generally, into the CSDP sent a signal to Russia that the EU presented a united front. In parallel, Copenhaguen sent the clear message that European partners could count on Denmark [16]. Additionally, Denmark has entered a rather binding commitment by joining the CSP. One may argue that the country has traded some aspects of its national sovereignty for security. The Danish army is now involved in EU training missions and plans to join defence capability planning processes [15].
Overall, Denmark’s admission into PESCO reflects how the European mindset has changed since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The sense of emergency created by the war has led several nations to reconsider their security policy: a traditionally neutral country such as Finland decided to join NATO, and a rather Eurosceptic country such as Denmark opted to finally join PESCO. Copenhagen’s participation in EU defence frameworks is a symbolic event that demonstrates European unity. Nevertheless, Denmark’s opt-in does not erase several issues that challenge the EU’s united front. In fact, Hungary’s stance on the war remains ambiguous and shows that divisions still exist among European leaders [17]. Such challenges remain to be dealt with.
Edited by Justine Peries.
References
[1] Billon-Galland, Alice, and Martin Quencez. “Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defense?” GMF, 6 Oct. 2017, www.gmfus.org/news/can-france-and-germany-make-pesco-work-process-toward-eu-defense.
[2] Emmott, Robin. “‘Bad News for Our Enemies’: EU Launches Defence Pact.” Reuters, 17 Dec. 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-defence-idUSKBN1E82BA.
[3] Stroobants, Jean-Pierre, and Cécile Ducourtieux. “L’Europe « À Plusieurs Vitesses » Divise Est Et Ouest.” Le Monde.fr, 10 Mar. 2017, www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/03/10/l-europe-a-plusieurs-vitesses-divise-est-et-ouest_5092464_3214.html.
[4] “EU Defence Cooperation: Council Welcomes Denmark Into PESCO and Launches the 5th Wave of New PESCO Projects.” consilium.europa, 23 May 2023, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/23/eu-defence-cooperation-council-welcomes-denmark-into-pesco-and-launches-the-5th-wave-of-new-pesco-projects.
[5] Mora Benavente, Enrique. “Time for the Sleeping Beauty to Wake.” ECFR, 22 Oct. 2020, ecfr.eu/article/commentary_time_for_the_sleeping_beauty_to_wake.
[6] Henley, Jon. “Angela Merkel: EU Cannot Completely Rely on US and Britain Any More.” The Guardian, 3 Feb. 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/28/merkel-says-eu-cannot-completely-rely-on-us-and-britain-any-more-g7-talks.
[7] Sansone, Kurt. “Safeguarding Neutrality and Indifference: The Decision to Opt Out of EU Military Cooperation.” MaltaToday.com.mt, 3 Mar. 2023, www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/121524/safeguarding_neutrality_and_indifference_the_decision_to_opt_out_of_eu_military_cooperation.
[8] Schaart, Eline. “The in Crowd? Denmark Votes on Joining EU Defense Cooperation.” POLITICO, 31 May 2022, www.politico.eu/article/eu-euroskepticism-loom-denmark-vote-defense-policy-russia-war.
[9] Barrett, Michael. “Why Does Denmark Have Three EU ‘opt-outs’ and What Do They Mean?” The Local Europe, 5 Dec. 2023, www.thelocal.com/20231205/why-does-denmark-have-three-eu-opt-outs-and-what-do-they-mean.
[10] Campbell, Charlie. “Denmark Just Reversed 30 Years of Euroskeptic Defense Policy—Thanks to Russia.” TIME, 1 June 2022, time.com/6183159/denmark-referendum-defense-eu-russia.
[11] Descamps, Lucile. “Tensions En Arctique : Cinq Minutes Pour Comprendre Les Enjeux Dans La Région.” leparisien.fr, 19 May 2021, www.leparisien.fr/international/tensions-en-arctique-cinq-minutes-pour-comprendre-les-enjeux-dans-la-region-18-05-2021-MEVHFSR2IZAOTOZHNVUVLG7UQ4.php.
[12] Laruelle, Marlène. “La Politique Arctique De La Russie – Une Stratégie De Puissance Et Ses Limites.” Notes De L’IFRI, Mar. 2020, www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/laruelle_politique_arctique_russie_2020.pdf.
[13] Toute l’Europe, and Boran Tobelem. “La Politique De Sécurité Et De Défense Commune (PSDC).” Touteleurope.eu, 19 July 2023, www.touteleurope.eu/l-ue-dans-le-monde/la-politique-de-securite-et-de-defense-commune-psdc.
[14] Kluger Rasmussen, Maja, and Catharina Sørensen. “Denmark: A Pragmatic Euroscepticism.” IFRI – Institut Français Des Relations Internationales, Mar. 2016, www.ifri.org/en/publications/publications-ifri/denmark-pragmatic-euroscepticism.
[15] “Denmark Joins the European Defence Agency.” Default, 2023, eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue25/cover-story/denmark-joins-the-european-defence-agency.
[16] Mørk, Pelle Lykkebo. “Danskerne Stemmer Ja Til at Afskaffe Forsvarsforbeholdet.” nyheder.tv2.dk, 1 June 2022, nyheder.tv2.dk/samfund/2022-06-01-danskerne-stemmer-ja-til-at-afskaffe-forsvarsforbeholdet.
[17] Kornél, Albert. “Comment Viktor Orban, Jadis Adversaire De La Russie, Est Tombé Sous La Coupe De Vladimir Poutine.” Le Figaro, 15 Dec. 2023, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/jadis-adversaire-de-la-russie-le-premier-ministre-hongrois-viktor-orban-est-tombe-sous-la-coupe-de-vladimir-poutine-20231214.
ESCP International Politics Society 
Leave a comment