By Lorenzo Cappelletti.

The tenth European Parliament elections come at a sensitive time. The ballot result’s predictions attribute heightened powers to far-right parties in what might become the most polarised assembly ever. 

Along with Europeans, half the world’s population will head to the polls in more than 80 countries during the year [1]. The resulting volatility inserts itself into a seething international scenario, rattled by the military and geographical escalation in Gaza and persistent strife in Ukraine. While navigating the internal ideological confrontation, Europe must cope with a complex and evolving geopolitical landscape.

European far-right’s rise

The 400 million European voters are called to vote from 6 to 9 June. The following discussion will rely on forecast data from the ECFR statistical model to investigate the impact of voters’ preferences. Before delving into tedious but necessary predictions, a worth-mentioning premise regarding the unforeseeability of precise outcomes has to be made. National parties’ adherence to European political groups heavily complicates the estimates. To this day, the affiliation of several national groups is ambiguous. Fratelli d’Italia (Italy), currently belonging to European Conservatives and Reformists (ECC), may be approached by the European People’s Party (EPP) [2]. Victor Orbán’s Fidesz, instead, may decide to join ECR [2]. Movimento Cinque Stelle (Italy), BSW (Germany), Sumar (Spain), and Third Way (Poland) are undergoing similar conversations [2]. 

Despite the self-evident difficulties in forecasting the global second-largest election, a sharp turn to the Right for the European Assembly seems uncontested. In November 2023, The Party for Freedom appeared ahead in Dutch elections [2]. Hungary and Italy have crowned Fidesz and Fratelli d’Italia, respectively. Far-right parties are likely to top the polls in six more countries and come second or third in the other nine countries [2]. 

The rise of the Far-Right in several national settings ought to result in the Identity and Democracy (ID) group gaining 40 seats and European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) gaining 18 seats [2]. The two rightmost political groups of the Parliament—Fidesz’s 18 seats excluded—could account for 25% of MEPs [2].

On the other end of the spectrum, the Far-Left groups should expand their representation from 38 to 44 seats. Half of their representatives should come from La France Insoumise, DIE LINKE, and its separatists from BSW (although the German party has shown interest in creating a new group within the European Assembly) [3] [4] [5].

The polarisation of the European Parliament will come at the expense of its two greatest political groups. The European People’s Party will drop from 178 to 173 seats [5], suffering from the decline of Forza Italia, the Christian Social Union, and the Christian Democratic Union. Furthermore, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) is likely to lose 10 seats at the hands of the downfall of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom, totaling 131[2] [6].

Lastly, Renew Europe (RE) and Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA) ought to lose 15 and 10 seats, respectively, mainly due to losses in France, Germany, and Spain [2].

(Graphs by ECFR)

Coalitions

Several coalitions may arise after the elections, affecting the balance of power across EU institutions. Indeed, in the early summer, the European Parliament will have to approve the Council’s proposals for a new European Commission president. While Ursula von der Leyen’s confirmation is highly likely, varying allegiances may confuse the issue [7].

The current grand coalition, comprising EPP, S&D, and liberals from RE, is expected to drop from 420 to 390 seats [2]. This alliance, arguably the most anticipated, would support Ursula von der Leyen’s reelection [7]. 

While the grand coalition’s majority would still exist, the covenant may necessitate reinforcements. To this end, either G/EFA or ECR could participate in the allegiance talks [8]. If the latter were to be integrated, the odds for the Commission’s presidency would lean towards a more conservative candidate [8].

Finally, the possibility of a right-wing coalition, with a majority of 370 seats from EPP, ECC, and ID, seems implausible. Divergent positions on EU expansion, immigration, and war in Ukraine would heavily complicate the discussions [8]. 

While the rise of the extreme and populist Rights might not result in their participation in majority coalitions, the new balance will undoubtedly impact the EU’s policy agenda and legislation. Indeed, coalitions on policy issues in the European Parliament tend not to be the result of formal agreements. Instead, political groups usually decide how to vote on a case-by-case basis [2]. The following paragraphs will delve into specific dynamics that may affect both external and internal affairs.

External Affairs

European geopolitical projections must start from Ukraine’s war considerations. While the parliamentary shift is not expected to result in extreme positional changes, the new equilibrium will be less inclined to support the most ambitious funding projects [10]. Difficulty in raising funding will come at the worst possible time for Zelensky. With the probable reduction in financial aid from the United States and the Russian offensive progressing, Ukraine will struggle to keep afloat economically and militarily [10].

In the same political direction, European humanitarian aid in Gaza may be subject to downward pressure [11]. Nevertheless, Ursula von der Leyen’s reelection would foster continuous positions on both battlefronts.

The confirmation of the current Commission President would facilitate a consistent Chinese policy agenda [12]. Last June’s introduction of the European de-risking strategy represented a stepping stone towards addressing Asia’s giant issues. China’s economic and political threats will require increasingly cohesive action by member States.

Lastly, European commercial policies will affect external relations. The new assembly would favor increasing trade barriers to foreign products [13]. This tendency may be exacerbated if Donald Trump wins November’s elections. With the Republican candidate in charge, trade tensions between the EU and the US might arise again, resulting in a severe escalation of tariffs [14]. 

Internal Affairs

The new parliament design will unleash its most disruptive consequences on environmental issues.The latest green policies have been approved by small margins and supported by RE, G/EFA, S&D, and the Left [2]. After June’s election, the mentioned coalition is expected to lose its weak majority. For example, it is worth noting that the recent EU Nature Restoration Law would have been rejected by the forecasted assembly [2].

The rise of the Far-Right will likely erode member states’ obligations to elevate their ambitions and commit to their national energy and climate plans [15]. Such a backdrop would enhance the European Commission’s responsibility for environmental issues; the institution’s 27 members will be called upon to ensure adequate public and private funding to sustain a smooth green transition [15].

Finally, the upcoming elections may propel a shift towards more economic, fiscal, and regulatory freedom for member states. Eurosceptic parties like the ECR, ID, and some members within the EPP would drive the change of course, advocating for less interference from Brussels [2]. These same political factions will support more restrictive EU migration and asylum policy, prompting an overall more divided and folded Europe [2]. 

Edited by Justine Peries.

References

[1] Livingstone, Helen. “Elections tracker 2024: every vote and why it matters.” The Guardian, 23 February 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/23/2024-global-elections-tracker-voting-dates-us-india-indonesia-belarus-haiti-pakistan-full-list. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[2] Sulova, Katerina, and Szymon Kardaś. “A sharp right turn: A forecast for the 2024 European Parliament elections.” European Council on Foreign Relations, 23 January 2024, https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-sharp-right-turn-a-forecast-for-the-2024-european-parliament-elections/. Accessed 14 March 202

[3] Toute l’Europe, 3 June 2009, https://www.touteleurope.eu/institutions/elections-europeennes-2024-qu-indiquent-les-sondages-pour-la-france/. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[4] Wagenknecht, Sahra. “Germany’s rebel Wagenknecht plots new left-wing group in EU Parliament.” Euractiv, 22 February 2024, https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/germanys-rebel-wagenknecht-plots-new-left-wing-group-in-eu-parliament/. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[5] “European elections in a chaotic Germany.” Eurac Research, 13 February 2024, https://www.eurac.edu/en/blogs/eureka/european-elections-in-a-chaotic-germany. Accessed 14 March 2024

[6] “General Elections 2023 Netherlands.” Fondation Robert Schuman, 22 November 2023, https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/monitor/5955-the-radical-right-largely-ahead-in-the-dutch-general-election. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[7] Quaritsch, Luise. “On the road to the 2024 European elections: Institutional timeline and missed opportunities.” Jacques Delors Centre, https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/on-the-road-to-the-2024-european-elections-institutional-timeline-and-missed-opportunities. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[8] VonBreithenThurn, Leo. “European Elections: A Game-changer in 2024?” Geopolitical Monitor, 11 December 2023, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/european-elections-a-game-changer-in-2024/. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[9] Ebert, Niklas. “What’s at Stake in the EU Elections: Ukraine Aid.” German Marshall Fund, 20 February 2024, https://www.gmfus.org/news/whats-stake-eu-elections-ukraine-aid. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[10] Ebert, Niklas. “What’s at Stake in the EU Elections: Ukraine Aid.” German Marshall Fund, 20 February 2024, https://www.gmfus.org/news/whats-stake-eu-elections-ukraine-aid. Accessed 14 March 2024

[11] EU observer, 3 June 2009, https://euobserver-com.translate.goog/eu-elections/158093?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=it&_x_tr_hl=it&_x_tr_pto=sc. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[12] Barkin, Noah. “What’s at Stake in the EU Elections: China Policy.” German Marshall Fund, 14 December 2023, https://www.gmfus.org/news/whats-stake-eu-elections-china-policy. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[13] Chase, Peter. “What’s at Stake in the EU Elections: Trade and Investment.” German Marshall Fund, 29 January 2024, https://www.gmfus.org/news/whats-stake-eu-elections-trade-and-investment. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[14] Grieger, Gisela. “Carriages preview | Legislative Train Schedule.” Carriages preview | Legislative Train Schedule, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-stronger-europe-in-the-world/file-eu-us-trade-talks. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[15] Abdullah, Hannah. “What’s at Stake in the EU Elections: Climate on the Ballot.” German Marshall Fund, 7 February 2024, https://www.gmfus.org/news/whats-stake-eu-elections-climate-ballot. Accessed 14 March 2024.

[Cover Image] Photo by: Artur Roman. Licensed under Pexels.