A change in paradigm regarding European defense

By Louis Brugel.

The EU is often described as an economic giant but a political “dwarf” [1]. At the time of the Berlin Wall’s fall, Europeans believed in the illusion of the end of history, as theorized by Francis Fukuyama [2] [3]. This has led European countries to reduce their military spending and focus on commerce [4]. However, in recent years, the block has been confronted with a series of crises massively changing Europeans’ views on defense issues [5]. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has acted as a wake-up call for European nations. Furthermore, the perspective of a Trump re-election is causing fears about whether the United States will keep its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, European countries are increasing their defense spending [6]. European defense can be described as any action in favor of a common defense among European states in either a bilateral, multilateral or union-level way [7]. In the context of the upcoming June 2024 European Parliament elections, defense is an important topic on which parties must position themselves. In fact, according to polls, 81% of Europeans agree on the fact that the current geopolitical context makes it even more important to vote [8]. In addition, defense and security are now the main electoral campaign priorities in nine EU member states [8]. Europeans see defense and security as a means to strengthen the EU’s position in world affairs [8].

An absence of consensus on what European defense is about

Almost 50% of Europeans believe the Union should develop its military strategy in the face of the Russian threat and a less reliable United States [6]. Traditionally, pro-European voters that lean to the center-left and the center-right tend to be more favorable to European defense [6]. Nonetheless, many traditionally Eurosceptic voters are now coming to terms with the idea of a common European defense. In fact, over one-third of Eurosceptic voters believe the EU should prioritize European defense, according to a Euronews poll [6]. Additionally, support for more ambitious military policies within EU frameworks has reached 45% of the electorate voting for the European Conservative & Reformist party, of which Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy is a member. Similarly, the result reaches more than one-third of those voting for Identity & Democracy, of which Marine Lepen’s National Rally is part [6] [6]. Nonetheless, stakeholders develop different visions of European defense depending on national interests and political ideologies. Nations bordering Russia, such as Poland and Finland, are particularly interested in European defense [6]. Also, certain countries are more reluctant to any European defense altogether; this is the case of Austria, which is constitutionally neutral, and Hungary, which has adopted an ambiguous stance towards Russia  [6]. Some MEPs on the far-right still perceive European defense as being an attack on national sovereignty; this is the case of Jean-Paul Garraud from Identity & Democracy who argues that soldiers are not ready to die for Europe [6]. Many on the far-left are also skeptical of a European common defense. Indeed, Germany’s Die Linke and several communist parties have pledged to decrease military spending and to dismantle nuclear arsenals in Europe [6]. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that it remains unclear what European defense is about. Should the EU develop a NATO-style military alliance? Should European defense only be about prioritizing the acquisition of European weapons? Should the EU develop a common army?

Breton and von der Leyen’s plans for European defense

For the moment, Thierry Breton, the EU Single Market Commissioner, is aiming for a defense fund of €100bn to favor cooperation in the defense industry [6]. In parallel, current European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, is focusing on defense issues to be reappointed. She has emitted the idea of creating a “defense commissioner.” Von der Leyen is currently the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) candidate for the presidency of the European Commission [9]. The EPP’s candidate is thus running on a platform that promises to increase funding for the defense sector. Her objective consists of procuring 50% of the defense procurement budget in the EU by 2030 [9]. Rewarding member states for joining European defense programs is also part of her plans via increased funding rates, VAT exemptions, and the opportunity to issue debt-titles for long-term financing of armament programs. Unfortunately for von der Leyen, financial resources are too low to reach these targets [9].

Obstacles to European defense

Conflicting national interests and different views on what European defense should be about are preventing the establishment of the EU as a serious geopolitical stakeholder. During her first “State of the Union” address in 2020, European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, argued that the world needed the EU’s leadership to shape a better global order [2]. Nonetheless, given the current situation in the wake of the next EU elections, reality lies below von der Leyen’s objectives [2]. The EU is regarded as a “passive object of international politics”; the bloc does not have the means to assert its influence in the geopolitical arena [2]. Several factors can explain the EU’s failure to develop its geopolitical might. The Council, composed of the Heads of State and governments, is regularly blocked by its decision-making rules that require unanimity. This situation prevents the establishment of a defense union among EU member states. France and Germany both support intergovernmental defense arrangements but have different motivations, creating uncertainties and paralyzing decision-making[2]. As a matter of fact, both countries want to avoid the other being in a position of dominance in a potential European defense union. France is the only nuclear power in the bloc and could use this tool to assert its domination over European defense while Germany benefits from strong industrial and economic capabilities that influence its foreign policy [2].

Materializing European defense

1. Institutional obstacles

Member states must counter several obstacles to establish an efficient European defense.In fact, there are institutional limits to a common European defense. Defense remains excluded from the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union which means that defense remains a prerogative of member states. Moreover, spending from the EU budget can only be decided upon based on the unanimity rule. This entails that all Member States must agree to take a decision. Given these institutional constraints, European defense is currently confined to industrial matters. Given the fact that foreign policy and defense remain a member states’ competence, harmonizing defense policies is a difficult task to achieve [9]. 

2. Economic hurdles

The question of fiscal space is also important to consider. A country like France is facing a deficit of more than 5% of its GDP, which could reduce its capacity to raise defense spending without cutting expenditures in other areas. This situation explains why certain EU member states call for pan-European frameworks to increase EU defense expenditures. The idea of using frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine has been evoked. Additionally, French President Emmanuel Macron has developed the idea of creating EU defense bonds [9]. 

3. Political divisions

Conflicting interests on debt, transatlantic ties, neutrality, and different stances on which tone to adopt in relations with the Kremlin must be overcome. More importantly, Germany refused to support a “buy-European” clause against France and several other countries that wanted spending to be exclusively concentrated on European material [9]. Countries such as Germany wish to give a political dimension to their acquisitions. In fact, they believe that buying American weapons will ensure US protection [7]. The lack of cohesion in the block thus poses a serious challenge to the prospect of witnessing the materialization of European defense. Nevertheless, a Trump election could potentially push Germany to follow the French path, thus improving coordination among EU member states [9].

Shifts are taking place in European defense due to geopolitical dynamics. Nonetheless, increased spending is insufficient to ensure a resilient and independent Europe on security matters. Despite a growing consensus on the need for some form of European defense, divergent national interests and political ideologies pose a serious obstacle to a common defense in Europe. In this context, the upcoming European elections may have an impact on the future of European defense. The question now is whether the EU will be capable of becoming a political giant.

Edited by Justine Peries.

References:

[1] Joannin, Pascale. “L’Europe En 2025 : Géant Économique, Nain Politique ?” GéOéConomie/Géoéconomie, vol. n° 50, no. 3, July 2009, pp. 79–85. https://doi.org/10.3917/geoec.050.0079.

[2] Schickler, Jack. “EU Defence a Priority Even for Eurosceptics: Exclusive Poll.” Euronews, 27 Mar. 2024, http://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/03/27/eu-defence-a-priority-even-for-eurosceptics-exclusive-poll.

[3] Fleming, Chris. “The End of History: Francis Fukuyama’s Controversial Idea Explained.” The Conversation, 20 Nov. 2022, theconversation.com/the-end-of-history-francis-fukuyamas-controversial-idea-explained-193225.

[4] Fay, Sophie. “Des « Dividendes De La Paix » Aux Coûts De La Guerre Économique.” Le Monde.fr, 21 Sept. 2023, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/09/21/des-dividendes-de-la-paix-aux-couts-de-la-guerre-economique_6190299_3232.html.

[5] Fries, Charles. “The European Institutions Dealing With Crises.” Fondation Robert Schuman, 9 May 2023, www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0668-the-european-institutions-dealing-with-crises.

[6] Barroso, Antonio, et al. “EU Elections 2024 Spotlight: Promises and Risks Abound for the Future of Defence in Europe.” Teneo, 7 May 2024, http://www.teneo.com/insights/articles/eu-elections-2024-spotlight-promises-and-risks-abound-for-the-future-of-defence-in-europe.

[7] L’Opinion (Avec LabSense). “Elections Européennes 2024: Quels Sont Les Enjeux En Matière De Défense ?” L’Opinion, 24 Apr. 2024, www.lopinion.fr/international/elections-europeennes-2024-quels-sont-les-enjeux-en-matiere-de-defense.

[8] europarl.europa.eu. “Geopolitical Situation Makes Voting in European Elections Even More Important | News | European Parliament.” europarl.europa.eu, 17 Apr. 2024, www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240415IPR20389/geopolitical-situation-makes-voting-in-european-elections-even-more-important.

[9] Bellais, Renaud, and Axel Nicolas. “Cinq Années Qui Ont Transformé La Défense Européenne : Enjeux Pour L’Union Européenne Après L’élection De Juin 2024 – Fondation Jean-Jaurès.” Fondation Jean-Jaurès, 29 Apr. 2024, jean-jaures.org/publication/cinq-annees-qui-ont-transforme-la-defense-europeenne-enjeux-pour-lunion-europeenne-apres-lelection-de-juin-2024.

[Cover Image] Photo by Sara Kurfeß under Unsplash