By Arthur Descazeaud.

In line with its reputation as a normative power, the European Union takes a stricter approach to artificial intelligence regulation than other countries, such as the United States. As a matter of fact, US Vice President JD Vance criticised the European Union’s “excessive regulation” at the Paris AI Summit [1]. As French physicist and philosopher of science Étienne Klein points out, Europeans view scientific developments and innovation differently from Americans. They tend to emphasise the meaning of their actions and the potential consequences of each new step [2]. This approach may be perceived as contributing to slower progress; however, it presents considerable advantages, particularly in terms of enhanced oversight regarding the social implications of each advancement.

However, the recent rapid development of artificial intelligence worldwide shows that, even with great caution, keeping up with scientific breakthroughs remains a significant challenge from a regulatory perspective. A clear example is the Italian Data Protection Authority’s temporary ban on ChatGPT on March 30, 2023, due to concerns about potential violations of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) obligations [3]. The authority requested OpenAI to demonstrate that the tool complies with European law, particularly regarding transparency, legal data collection, result accuracy, and age verification mechanisms.

While artificial intelligence impacts nearly every aspect of European citizens’ lives, some effects are less evident than others. The influence of algorithms on competition law, for instance, is largely overlooked by the general public—a curious disregard considering its implications for consumers.

European competition law foundations

Three main pillars lie at the heart of European competition law: Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and merger regulations [4]. The main goal is to create a fair and equal environment for businesses, innovation, and standards to develop, while also protecting consumers. In practice, this means that the European Commission actively monitors anti-competition practices, mergers and state aid awarded to companies [5].

Article 101 aims to prohibit any agreement that could hinder competition, such as, but not exclusively, price-fixing, imposing limits on production, or market-sharing practices [6]. Meanwhile, Article 102 focuses on dominant market players and prevents them from engaging in abusive behaviour, such as practices that exclude competitors from a given market [7]. Lastly, merger regulations allow the European Commission to examine projects exceeding certain thresholds to maintain a healthy competitive environment at the Union level [8].

European Union competition law actors

Many institutions are involved in enforcing European competition law, both at the national and EU levels. At the national level, each member state has its own National Competition Authority (NCA), responsible for enforcing competition law within its jurisdiction. For example, France has the Autorité de la concurrence, Germany the Bundeskartellamt, and Bulgaria the Commission for Protection of Competition [9]. At the EU level, four main institutions play a role: the European Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Parliament, and the Council. While the Parliament and the Council design the competition policy through legislation, the Commission serves as the executive body responsible for enforcing the rules. Meanwhile, the ECJ ensures the uniform interpretation and application of competition law across the European Union [10]. 

Moreover, to ensure effective coordination, the European Competition Network (ECN) was established, fostering cooperation between the Commission and NCAs, as well as among NCAs themselves, particularly in cases involving cross-border competition issues.

New challenges arising from artificial intelligence in European competition law

As in other domains, questions remain about the extent to which AI will disrupt the current European competition law framework. However, some key concerns have already been identified, such as collusion and abuse of dominance [11].

Pricing collusion occurs when two or more actors agree on prices, either explicitly or tacitly [4]. The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) identified the first European example of tacit collusion in 2016. In this case, two Amazon sellers had agreed not to undercut each other when no cheaper third-party seller was present. In practice, both sellers used pricing softwares that automatically adjusted their prices in response to competitors while deliberately excluding each other from the analysis. The CMA deemed this an illegal agreement to prevent, restrict, or distort market competition [12]. 

While cases like this clearly breach competition law, other instances of pricing coordination fall into a legal gray area as tacit collusion. The increasing use of pricing algorithms presents a growing challenge for regulators, as highlighted in a 2018 CMA report. One of the most important concerns is the so-called ‘hub-and-spoke’ model, where competitors rely on the same third-party pricing software. This could potentially enable the software to raise prices collectively, maximising profits at the expense of competition [13]. Such a situation is unlikely to occur without this type of software, as competitors typically react to each other’s pricing decisions, and few would risk raising prices unilaterally.

Furthermore, algorithms are also used in cases of market dominance abuse. One of the most notable European examples is the Commission’s decision in case AT.39740, which resulted in a €2.42 billion fine against Google in 2017 for favouring its own comparison shopping service over those of its competitors by placing it at the top of search results [11] [14]. Google appealed the decision multiple times, but the case was ultimately closed by the European Court of Justice in 2024 in favour of the Commission. However, the ECJ emphasised that this ruling should not be seen as a precedent for all self-preferencing cases. The Court highlighted the need to assess each situation individually and clarified that the ruling was based not only on Google’s self-preferencing practices but also on the deliberate downgrading of competitors, which played a crucial role in the final decision. Concretely, Google placed other major comparison shopping services like Yelp and Dealo.de on average around page four of search results [15].

Lastly, artificial intelligence capabilities can also pose challenges to competition law in the context of mergers and acquisitions. For example, on October 31, 2024, the European Commission took up the case of Nvidia’s acquisition of the Israeli startup Run:ai, initially flagged by the Italian Competition Authority [16]. Although the acquisition did not meet the standard revenue threshold for Commission review, the Commission invoked the rarely used Article 22(1) of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), which allows it to assess smaller deals that fall below the EU’s merger revenue thresholds [17]. While the Commission ultimately approved the acquisition, the case highlights growing regulatory scrutiny in this area. The Commission’s primary concern was that the transaction could harm competition in the European market, particularly in the supply of discrete graphics processing units (GPUs) for data centers and GPU orchestration software [18]. Given the synergies between the two companies’ core businesses, the merger could have affected these areas—for instance, by disrupting the market supply chain or influencing pricing.

European regulatory responses so far

Three main initiatives can be identified as responses to the growing concerns over artificial intelligence’s impact on European competition law: the Digital Markets Act (DMA), changes to merger control policies, and, perhaps most significantly, the AI Act. 

The primary aim of the Digital Markets Act, which came into force on November 1, 2022, is to establish objective criteria for identifying so-called “gatekeepers”—large digital platforms that provide core services—and to impose specific regulations on them [19]. As of today, Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta, and Microsoft have been designated as gatekeepers [11]. The DMA primarily addresses concerns related to data usage and market concentration [20]. As MEP Andreas Schwab points out, the DMA was not specifically designed to regulate the effects of generative AI on market competition—it does not even mention artificial intelligence. However, it remains a valuable tool since the largest technology companies, which are also the leading developers of generative AI, fall within its scope. Moreover, Schwab highlights the adaptability and immediate applicability of the DMA, which he considers an advantage over frameworks like the AI Act [20]. While the regulation is not without its limitations, the European Union still remains ahead of many other regions in tackling these challenges.

In terms of merger control policies, the Commission, as demonstrated in the Nvidia case outlined above, now has the ability to investigate transactions that fall below the defined revenue thresholds. Originally, Article 22 was a tool for Member States to refer transactions to the Commission. However, since 2020, the Commission has started reinterpreting the Article to allow for the investigation of transactions that do not meet the thresholds but are still deemed worthy of analysis [21]. This new practice has sparked debates, and the situation remains somewhat unclear, with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) frequently being called upon to assess the Commission’s authority in this regard.

Finally, the AI Act, which entered into force on August 1, 2024, as the “world’s first comprehensive legal framework for regulating artificial intelligence” [4] is not a competition law per se but aims to foster the development of AI within the Union while ensuring the protection of consumers’ fundamental rights. As such, it has implications for companies’ adherence to existing competition laws at the EU level. For example, the AI Act seeks to increase transparency regarding the development and use of AI systems. Information about high-risk AI systems—such as those used in critical infrastructure, education, employment, and other sectors—must be shared not only with regulators but also with other actors, including competitors and distributors. If not managed carefully, this sharing of information could potentially breach European competition rules [22]. Moreover, the AI Act requires that all Member States establish a market surveillance authority to enforce the Act and collect information from companies. These authorities will be required to report to the Commission and share any information of potential interest regarding competition law with national competition authorities. This marks the first time that competition authorities will receive company information from other authorities without the need for ongoing investigations or suspicion. Given that the threshold for sharing this information is relatively low (information that could be of potential interest), it is likely that competition authorities will receive a significant flow of data to analyse and use in relation to artificial intelligence, thanks to the AI Act [22].

What’s ahead ?

Although the European Union is already well-equipped to address market competition issues, the development of algorithms and artificial intelligence presents a significant challenge to the current environment. It is difficult to predict the extent to which these technologies will alter the competition landscape in the future, especially since they are not yet fully mature. However, European regulators will undoubtedly need to stay abreast of new breakthroughs and practices in the field to protect the Union from potential abuses. It will be interesting to monitor the effectiveness of the new AI Act and its impact on competition authorities’ ability to anticipate and adapt.

Edited by Justine Dukmedjian and Justine Peries.

References

[1] MADHANI, AAMER, and THOMAS ADAMSON. “JD Vance rails against ‘excessive’ AI regulation in a rebuke to Europe at the Paris AI summit.” AP News, 11 February 2025, https://apnews.com/article/paris-ai-summit-vance-1d7826affdcdb76c580c0558af8d68d2. Accessed 9 March 2025.

[2] Le Crayon, and Étienne Klein. “Science : l’Europe réfléchit, les États-Unis foncent ?” Youtube, 5 March 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbThETGl95o.

[3] Simmons & Simmons LLP. “The Italian supervisory authority temporarily suspended ChatGPT.” Simmons & Simmons, 15 May 2023, https://www.simmons-simmons.com/en/publications/clhosghof007iuv3sc2jdo0s3/the-italian-supervisory-authority-temporarily-suspended-chatgpt.

[4] TaylorWessing, and Paolo Palmigiano. “AI and Competition law – the next frontier?” TaylorWessing, 11 August 2024, https://www.taylorwessing.com/fr/insights-and-events/insights/2024/08/ai-and-competition-law-the-next-frontier.

[5] European Union. “Promoting fair competition – EU action.” European Union, https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/actions-topic/competition_en.

[6] “EUR-Lex – 12008E101 – EN.” EUR-Lex.europa.eu., https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E101:EN:HTML.

[7] “Application of Article 102 TFEU – European Commission.” Competition Policy, https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/legislation/application-article-102-tfeu_en.

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[9] European Commission. “National Competition Authorities – European Commission.” Competition Policy, https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/european-competition-network/national-competition-authorities_en. Accessed 2025.

[10] European Commission. “EU institutions and competition policy – European Commission.” Competition Policy, https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/what-competition-policy/eu-institutions-and-competition-policy_en. Accessed 2025.

[11] Thomson Reuters. “AI CHALLENGES IN COMPETITION LAW.” Mayer Brown, April 2024, https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectives-events/publications/2024/04/ai-challenges-in-competition-law_mar24.pdf%3Frev=55168f8e10a64e458c3fc1ac7af179df. Accessed 2025.

[12] Competition & Markets Authority. “Online sales of posters and frames, Case 50223.” CMA, 2016, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57ee7c2740f0b606dc000018/case-50223-final-non-confidential-infringement-decision.pdf. Accessed 2025.

[13] Competition & Markets Authority. “Pricing Algorithms.” CMA, 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5bbb2384ed915d238f9cc2e7/Algorithms_econ_report.pdf. Accessed 2025.

[14] EU Law Live. “General Court confirms 2.4 billion euros fine on Google for its abuse of dominance in Google Shopping.” EU Law Live, 10 November 2021, https://eulawlive.com/general-court-confirms-2-4-billion-euros-fine-on-google-for-its-abuse-of-dominance-in-google-shopping/. Accessed 2025.

[15] Heimann, Florian. “The End of the Google Shopping Saga – Kluwer Competition Law Blog.” Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 28 October 2024, https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2024/10/28/the-end-of-the-google-shopping-saga/. Accessed 2025.

[16] Mather, Ciarán. “EU investigates Nvidia acquisition of Run:ai over competition risk.” Silicon Republic, 1 November 2024, https://www.siliconrepublic.com/business/european-commission-nvidia-acquisition-ai-start-up-runai. Accessed 2025.

[17] Chee, Yun. “Nvidia takes EU antitrust regulators to court for probing AI startup Run:ai bid.” Reuters, 24 February 2025, https://www.reuters.com/technology/nvidia-takes-eu-antitrust-regulators-court-probing-ai-startup-runai-bid-2025-02-24/. Accessed 2025.

[18] Ribera, Teresa. “Commission approves acquisition of Run:ai by NVIDIA.” European Commission, 19 December 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6548. Accessed 2025.

[19] European Commission. “About the Digital Markets Act.” Digital Markets Act, https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/about-dma_en. Accessed 2025.

[20] Schwab, Andreas. “Digital Markets Act and artificial intelligence services” “.” Concurrences, 2024, https://www.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/_02b.concurrences_3-2024_insights_schwab.pdf?127933/a4ea0a1978022cc27d42654f71d17224d84f27c1f40c448a88d2027dff63ba66. Accessed 2025.

[21] Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. “European Commission Announces New Policy to Accept Member State Referrals for Merger Review Even if EC and National Thresholds Are Not Met.” Cleary Gottlieb, 12 October 2020, https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/new-ec-policy-anticipates-merger-referral-even-if-national-thresholds-not-met. Accessed 2025.

[22] Eversheds Sutherland. “The implications of the EU AI Act for competition law and enforcement.” Eversheds Sutherland, 6 March 2025, https://www.eversheds-sutherland.com/fr/france/insights/implications-of-the-eu-ai-act-for-competition-law. Accessed 2025.

[Cover Image] Image by TUREK90 from Pixabay (https://pixabay.com/illustrations/ai-generated-law-court-lawyer-8679714/) licensed under Pixabay.