By Maxim Baumgartel

In the beginning of September, Maxime Pierre and I joined the European Guanxi Youth Conference (EGYC) 2025 and the Young Indo Pacific Forum in Brussels, co-hosted by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Foundation). 

The conference included panels of researchers, policymakers and industry practitioners. The timing  of the event could not have been more appropriate as 2025 marks the 50th anniversary of EU–China diplomatic relations. In July, China hosted the 25th edition of the summit celebrating this bilateral partnership, amid growing geopolitical tensions. 

A “New World Order”?

The first panel dived headfirst into geopolitics. At the recent EU–China Summit, the EU delegation was led by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Council President Antonio Costa. The results from the EU–China Summit were branded “disappointing” [2], with the only real outcome being a joint climate statement. The outcome was modest given the scale of the relationship. 

The positions of the panellists varied, with some arguing that Europe is entering its own “century of humiliation,” though this time self-inflicted. Others cautioned against celebrating Europe’s apparent economic lead over China, noting that it reflects statistical inflation and China’s downturn more than genuine European growth.

Another panellist stressed that pragmatism is deeply ingrained in China’s ideology. It is necessary to shift perspectives from a Eurocentric view to a Sinocentric view to understand their policies and actions. China would support Russia in ways that serve its own interests, while at the same time prioritising stable relations with all its Western-aligned partners. That pragmatism is why the EU should tread carefully: disappointment doesn’t mean disengagement and should not stop it from attempting to maintain cultural and economic bridges. 

AI Regulation: Two Worlds Apart

The following discussion turned to AI, focusing not only on AI policy but also on military drones, dual-use technologies, and the vast gulf between EU data protection rules and China’s. The EU leads in ethics, safeguards, consumer & data protection, but such regulation means little without effective multilateralism.

Europe is moving forward in a more conventional manner, focusing heavily on the regulation of AI and its use within the European Union. The wish to pursue strong regulation is directly shown in the dual-use possibilities of artificial intelligence with its direct application in warfare. Facial recognition and data protection are still at the forefront of European regulation. Here, the focus lies in the respect of fundamental rights and the strong regulation of high-risk AI systems. Yet, we should recognise the difference in investments of the US, China and the European Union, with the US and China leading the way with Europe slowly trailing behind in their tracks. This does not mean that there is no AI innovation spawning out of the Union, Europe is clawing its way back into the race with large investments. The Commission is attempting to supercharge the European AI side with a mobilisation upwards of €200 billion, through their InvestAI initiative [3].  

Looking to the East, the goals are different. In China, the success of a company is tied more to its output and creating value through innovation, rather than the profits it is creating. Thus, the incentive is a lot higher for a company to focus on its AI research and development rather than chasing profits. Additionally, the proximity and availability of high-quality and strong processing chips through SMIC give them a significant edge in production, testing and execution. Through this close-knit network, China has set the tone with one of the world’s earliest and most comprehensive sets of rules covering algorithms, deepfakes, and generative artificial intelligence – including tools like ChatGPT and image-generation programmes. China’s leading position stems from its ability to act simultaneously as policymaker, investor, supplier, customer, and regulator in this sector [4], as well as acknowledging AI’s security and defence capabilities fundamental to the Communist Party’s survival.  

Trade & Economy: The Numbers Behind the Politics

In this session, the focus shifted towards the economy with a heavy focus on the effects of the new American tariffs. It was highlighted during this panel that little has changed since 2019, as the Biden administration had already difficult relations with its Chinese counterparts amidst the COVID pandemic. With the talk of a “reverse Kissinger” being floated through the room – unlike in the 1970s, where Kissinger engineered ties to China to isolate Russia, the flipside now entails courting Russia, to distance itself from China. A hint that Europe needs to rethink old strategic formulas. But when it comes to Russia, the panelists agreed that no one expects Beijing to sever ties with Moscow.

The EU, meanwhile, is scrambling to protect itself: tightening export controls on dual-use goods, talking about economic security, and supply chain diversification. Yet, paradoxically, both sides are neglecting the health of the relationship itself.

Foreign direct investment into China has been sliding for two years [5]. Fewer European companies are expanding there, and many are looking towards emerging markets instead. The idea is that the perceived boom of China has passed and the profits are often not being reinvested into China but rather in emerging markets. On paper, the EU is ramping up anti-dumping measures and taking a more targeted approach in trade governance.

But behind the numbers lie hard questions: are European companies leaving because China is too risky, or because Europe isn’t offering a clear alternative? Is Europe truly diversifying, or just reacting?

Looking Ahead: From Brussels to the Indo-Pacific

The EGYC, however, is only the beginning. The following day, the Young Indo-Pacific Forum (YIPF) shifted attention from Europe–China relations to the broader Indo-Pacific. While themes such as supply chains, strategic autonomy, infrastructure, and alliances overlap, the actors on stage are markedly different.

Europe’s shifting relationship with China will affect its credibility in the Indo-Pacific, just as Indo-Pacific perceptions of China will shape Europe’s options. At EGYC, the youth perspective came through strongly. The discussion revealed dwindling patience for symbolic gestures and a growing demand for concrete action. After 50 years of relations, a much-needed wake-up call between Europe and China is required: not another non-binding climate pledge [6], but a willingness to stop managing disappointment, start building trust, and opening our perspectives to learn and cooperate again.

Reflections from YIPF 2025: Europe Meets the Indo-Pacific

A day after the European Guanxi Youth Conference wrapped up in Brussels, the spotlight shifted to the Young Indo-Pacific Forum (YIPF). The YIPF focused on zooming out to the Indo-Pacific as a whole, with its tangled mix of security tensions, climate threats, and supply chain politics and Europe’s impact on the region. This broader perspective was necessary: suddenly, Europe’s role appeared more distant, less central, creating space to re-centre the discussion.

Geopolitical Tensions: Whose Security Counts?

One message came through loud and clear: for Pacific Island nations, the greatest security threat is climate change – not aircraft carriers or fighter jets. The rising seas and disappearing coastlines pervade every discussion. 

Yet, geopolitics never leave the discussions. Beijing prefers larger groupings it can shape to its advantage. Australia, while a global middle power, becomes a superpower within the Indo-Pacific – a reminder that influence depends on the scale of comparison.

Tuvalu – an island-country in Polynesia – recently held elections that epitomise the complex regional environment. The state had to choose whether it aligns with the PRC or Taiwan (ROC) matters less to the outside world than to Tuvalu’s own people. It’s a perfect example of how domestic politics ripple outward in the region.

From a European lens, though, there is still a lack of genuine engagement. Too often Europe frames incidents through its own narratives instead of listening to how Pacific actors see things. It is often the case that Europe translates the dynamics of the Pacific into European categories, rules and norms, instead of listening to how the regional actors themselves define their challenges.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), too, was compared not to the EU but to the European Political Community (EPC) – a new intergovernmental forum launched in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – more focused on sustaining relations than deep integration. That analogy says a lot, ASEAN’s cohesion is often overestimated.

What about the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)? European voices stressed the need to focus on what local people actually need: not to get sucked into great-power rivalry, but to work on adjacent issues like regulation and social stability.

Resilient Economies & Supply Chains: Triangular Tensions

If geopolitics is about climate and sovereignty, economics is about resilience and rivalry. The framework here was triangular: US–China–EU.

The US is pressing its economic-security agenda in Brussels, but some warned that the rhetoric of resilience risks breeding a false sense of autonomy. China, for its part, is deepening its dual circulation strategy, fortifying the domestic market while keeping one foot in the global economy.

As for Europe? It suffers from a structural handicap, a fractured capital market, albeit with a significant potential if implemented [6]. In Europe, the dominant concept is ‘strategic autonomy’ – the ambition to act in its own interest without over-reliance on others. Yet with a fragmented market and strong leadership from China and the US, this autonomy often looks less like policy and more like a slogan… Europeans may be procedural experts (WTO rules, regulatory standards), but proceduralism doesn’t always win markets.

Data sovereignty, supply chains, and green transition resilience were all flagged as areas that needed more than declarations and pledges. Meanwhile, traditional institutions like the WTO are losing traction, due to its consensus rule – meaning that one member can block reform – and US blockade of new Appellate Body judges (2019) [7]. 

History and Security: Shadows of the Past

The forum also touched on how history is used in today’s strategic contest. Ukraine has become a testing ground for modern warfare, with lessons feeding directly into Indo-Pacific military thinking.

Meanwhile, China continues to reshape its narrative as seen in recent WWII commemorations that increasingly emphasise the Kuomintang’s role against Japan alongside the CCP, subtly reshifting history to preserve legitimacy. It is a reminder that memory is also a weapon [8].

What Europe Needs to Hear

Leaving YIPF, I was struck by how secondary Europe feels in Indo-Pacific debates. Europe wants to be relevant, speaking strongly about strategic autonomy, digital sovereignty, resilience, while being accounted for as more procedural than practical.

For Europe to gain credibility, it must stop projecting and start engaging: listen when Pacific islands call climate change their greatest security threat, and support ASEAN and the PIF without an EU-centric lens. Above all, Europe cannot hope to be a ‘third pole’ in the US-China rivalry until it repairs its fragmented capital market.

Overall, where EGYC showed the frustration of EU–China relations, YIPF revealed Europe’s blind spots in the Indo-Pacific. Both conferences made one thing clear: young voices aren’t satisfied with recycled talking points. Whether in Brussels, Singapore or Sydney, the demands are the same. We must move beyond symbolism, and address on-the-ground challenges head-on.   

Edited by Maxime Pierre. 

References

[1] Council of the European Union. (2025, July 24). International Summit 2025: EU-China Summit. Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/07/24/

[2] Friends of Europe. (2025). Critical Thinking: The Post-Summit Outlook for EU-China Relations. Retrieved from https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/critical-thinking-the-post-summit-outlook-for-eu-china-relations/

[3] European Commission (2025). EU launches InvestAI initiative to mobilise €200 billion of investment in artificial intelligence. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_467

[4] Zhang, A.H. (2024), The Promise and Perils of China’s Regulation of Artificial Intelligence (January 28, 2024). Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (forthcoming). Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=4708676

[5] UN Conference on Trade and Development. (n.d.). Country Profile — China. UNCTAD STAT. Retrieved from https://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/156/index.html

[6] European Parliament. (2025). Strategic Autonomy in Practice: Briefing on EU Economic Security. EPRS BRIE (2025)765802_EN. Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/765802/EPRS_BRI(2025)765802_EN.pdf

[7] Reuters. (2024.). World Trade Organization’s push for reform plagued by obstacles. Retrieved October 6, 2025, from https://www.reuters.com/business/world-trade-organizations-push-reform-plagued-by-obstacles-2024-02-21

[8] Coble, P. M. (2007). China’s “New Remembering” of the Anti-Japanese War. The China Quarterly, 190, 394–410. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/20192776

[Cover image] Picture by Maxim Baumgaertel, European Guanxi youth conference, 2025.