1. Introduction
“When the wind of change blows, some build walls while others build windmills.” The 25th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), held in Tianjin on August 31 and September 1, offered a perfect illustration of this Chinese proverb. The event brought together some twenty Eurasian leaders, including Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-Un, and Narendra Modi [1]. As Donald Trump escalates tariff penalties, Beijing is positioning itself as the voice of a Global South weary of Western hegemony, presenting the vision of a “new world order.” But does this alignment around China signal a genuine strategic strengthening of the Global South, or merely a fragile facade masking deep internal divisions?
2. Trump’s Tariff Gamble
In a matter of months, Donald Trump upended long-standing geopolitical balances. Threats to the sovereignty of Canada and Denmark, challenges to the UN and NATO, tariffs of 15% on the European Union, up to 50% on India, and even 145% on China before a de-escalation [9]: his tariff policy has sown confusion within the Western alliance [4]. As André Chieng, vice-president of the France-China Committee, observed: “Donald Trump does not divide the world between democracies and authoritarian states; he divides it between weak and strong countries” [3]. This strategy – more improvised than coherent – reflects a transactional logic in which traditional allies are no longer clearly distinguished from adversaries. These new geopolitical realities allowed Beijing to present itself as a credible alternative to U.S. global leadership.
But one of Trump’s most significant geopolitical faux pas was to impose a 50% tariff on India, pushing the country towards China and bulldozing decades of carefully crafted bilateral collaboration from previous administrations [5].
3. India Between Two Giants
A widely circulated photograph shows Narendra Modi smiling alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. The image was anything but accidental: it sent a clear signal to Washington after Trump imposed a 50% tariff on India for its purchases of Russian oil [1]. The contrast was striking – the world’s largest democracy standing shoulder to shoulder with authoritarian leaders.
China and India, which together account for 40% of the global population, even presented themselves as “development partners” aiming to cooperate on resolving their long-standing border disputes [4]. Yet, to interpret this as the birth of a genuine alliance would be misleading. Historical territorial conflicts [1], as well as China’s strategic ties with Pakistan, make the prospect of a lasting rapprochement unlikely.
In reality, Modi has used relations with major powers to sustain a multi-alignment strategy: maintaining India in a position of balance between the West and the Eastern block. Still, India’s participation in the Tianjin summit could hint at a potential shift in New Delhi’s strategy; one whose outcome may tip the global balance of power [7].
4. The SCO as an organisation
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was created in 2001 by six countries: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The New York Times has described the forming of an “axis of upheaval” [10] ; states dissatisfied with the current international order and seeking to reshape it [5].
The summit has gradually expanded from a regional security forum into a broader framework of economic and commercial cooperation [1]. Today, its members include powers such as India, Pakistan, Iran, and even North Korea.
The principles put forward by Beijing and Moscow stress multilateralism, sovereign equality, and opposition to Western hegemony. Vladimir Putin spoke of building a “more just and equal system of global governance” [6] while Xi Jinping called for joint efforts to establish a “more balanced international framework” [4].
However, the military parade in Beijing on September 3 was intended to demonstrate that the quest for a “just order” does not exclude hard power[2]. The Financial Times noted the contradiction: “While [Xi Jinping] talks of respect for other nations’ sovereignty and commitment to the progress of human civilisation, he stands in solidarity with Putin, author of the brutal invasion of Ukraine, and Kim, a third-generation despot whose troops are helping the Russian campaign”. [8]
At the same time, the western block’s credibility is under scrutiny. How can these countries condemn Beijing’s support for Moscow but remain cautious in criticising Israel over violations of international law in Gaza? This highlights double standards not unique to China, as Western powers also apply international law selectively.
Still, the SCO’s strength as an organisation remains contested. It is based on an interstate model, very different from the European Union. Analysts such as Alexander Gabuev argue that the SCO is a “loose and dysfunctional organisation” [5]. Unlike the UN or NATO, it lacks both a collective defence mechanism and any real capacity for military projection [7]. Its internal divisions are equally striking: India and Pakistan clashed over Kashmir last May, while Iran was left isolated when bombed by Israel and the United States in June, with little solidarity shown by fellow SCO members [2].
5. The rise of the “Global South”
Xi Jinping has sought to present the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as more than a security forum, using it as a platform to promote China’s global ambitions. At Tianjin, he announced plans for a development bank, unveiled a cooperation mechanism for green and energy industries, and pledged $1.4 billion in loans over the next three years to SCO members [6]. The summit’s Tianjin Declaration also reaffirmed commitments to deepen cooperation on artificial intelligence, stressing the “equal rights of all countries to develop and use AI” [4] These measures, while unlikely to materialise in the short term, highlight Beijing’s ambition to lay the foundations of a new global governance framework – one that looks beyond the Bretton Woods world order.
In this context, Xi Jinping declared – implicitly targeting the United States – that “the world has entered a new phase of turbulence” and that “the shadows of the Cold War mentality and bullying have not disappeared, while new challenges are accumulating.” [4].
Yet enthusiasm for this vision remains ambiguous. As the Financial Times noted, “national leaders from across Asia and other regions flocked to China this week, [but] many will privately fear a substitution of the hegemony of a democratic US with one imposed by a communist China” [8] This illustrates the paradox of China’s leadership claim: it presents itself as a champion of sovereignty and equality, while simultaneously cultivating asymmetrical dependencies that leave smaller states wary.
6. Conclusion
The Tianjin summit revealed not the birth of a solid new alliance, but the fragility of an international system in transition. Trump’s tariffs, intended to reassert American power, have instead pushed countries like India to consider other alternatives, giving China the space to present itself as the voice of a “Global South.” Yet the contradictions within the SCO, and the divisions among its members show the limits of this project. Far from a decisive shift, the world appears locked in a fragile multipolar moment — one where the balance of power is more contested than ever, and where the very idea of a coherent western world remains elusive.
Edited by Maxime Pierre.
References
[1] Le Monde. “L’Inde ballottée entre la Chine et les États-Unis.” Le Monde, 4 Sept. 2025, www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2025/09/04/l-inde-ballottee-entre-la-chine-et-les-etats-unis_6638936_3232.html.
[2] Le Monde. “Face à ce Sud global dominé par la Chine, qui n’existe pas, l’Occident sous la férule de Donald Trump existe de moins en moins.”, 3 Sept. 2025, www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2025/09/03/face-a-ce-sud-global-domine-par-la-chine-qui-n-existe-pas-l-occident-sous-la-ferule-de-donald-trump-existe-de-moins-en-moins_6638760_3232.html.
[3] Spotify. “Géopolitique selon Xi Jinping. Avec André Chieng”, 2025, open.spotify.com/episode/1ooZjHfgGgHryWG0NC2DpJ?si=28b4357e8b5740f3.
[4] CNBC. “SCO Summit 2025: Key Takeaways from Beijing’s Push to Reshape Global Order.”, 2 Sept. 2025, www.cnbc.com/2025/09/02/sco-summit-2025-key-takeaways.html.
[5] Financial Times. “Xi Jinping Plots a Post-American World.”, 5 Sept. 2025, www.ft.com/content/26207277-0a76-4ed4-b34a-8dd27b6c83b4.
[6] Breitbart. “China’s Xi Seeks Expanded Role for Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Development Bank.”, 1 Sept. 2025, www.breitbart.com/news/chinas-xi-seeks-expanded-role-for-shanghai-cooperation-organization-with-development-bank/.
[7] AASSDN. “Tianjin: Trois Milliards d’Êtres Humains en Sommet.”, 6 Sept. 2025, aassdn.org/amicale/geopolitique-tianjin-trois-milliards-detres-humains-en-sommet/.
[8] Financial Times. “China’s New World Order.”, 3 Sept. 2025, www.ft.com/content/3d0aad05-402f-403b-aa8c-4935186b47e6.
[9] The Guardian. “Trump floats cutting Chinese tariffs from 145% to 80% before weekend talks.”, 9 May 2025,
[10]: Richard Fontaine and Andrea Kendall-Taylor.(2025, September 5). China-Russia-North Korea axis. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/05/opinion/china-russia-north-korea-axis.html
[Cover image] “Illustration de la carte du monde en marron” (https://www.pexels.com/fr-fr/photo/illustration-de-la-carte-du-monde-marron-1098526/) by Suzy Hazelwood (https://www.pexels.com/fr-fr/@suzyhazelwood/) licensed under Pexels.
Leave a comment