Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s controversial president from 2019 to 2023, was convicted in September 2025 for attempting to subvert the democratic order [1]. This unprecedented ruling marks a pivotal moment for Brazil’s institutions and offers a rare case study on how democratic institutions navigate both populist challenges and societal polarisation [2].
His election in 2019 was both a symptom and a consequence of Brazil’s fragile democracy since the end of the last military regime in 1985 [2]. The politician rose in the wake of a series of corruption scandals and growing nationwide disillusion with the government [3]. Dilma Rousseff and Lula da Silva’s cases served as catalysts for Bolsonaro’s political brand, feeding distrust in traditional parties and setting the stage for his anti-establishment populism [4]. Bolsonaro presented himself as anti-system, employing a strongman-style populist discourse and politics [5]. His strategy of mobilising grievances amongst evangelicals, positioning himself as an outsider politician led to building a strong sense of loyalty among his supporters who mention the sense of community the politician has given them [2]. This populist, grievance-based mobilisation laid the groundwork for his later challenges to electoral results [6].
From a theoretical perspective, Bolsonaro’s rise demonstrates broader risks of populism for democratic institutions: leaders often reject essential checks and balances, frame politics as a moral struggle, and foster an “us versus them” narrative, encouraging supporters to view power as concentrated in the leader’s hands [7]. Bolsonaro’s political style, therefore, exemplifies how populist strategies can both mobilise mass support and strain institutional norms.
The elections in 2023 led Lula da Silva to the presidential palace. Following his defeat in 2023, Bolsonaro alleged electoral fraud. Despite providing no evidence, his supporters stormed government buildings in Brasilia, leading to more than 1,500 arrests and setting the stage for his eventual political downfall [3][4]. Bolsonaro was barred from running until 2033, and later convicted of armed criminal conspiracy, attempted abolition of the democratic rule of law, attempted coup d’état, violent destruction of public property and damage to protected national heritage sites [5]. These events illustrate how populist leaders can exploit institutional weaknesses to challenge electoral legitimacy.
This case and conviction are historic for Brazilian democracy, unprecedented both in the charges and the ruling itself. It is unprecedented, not only in Brazil, but across the whole Latin American region [2]. It sets a standard nationally and regionally for governments and the judiciary to protect democracy. This unprecedented ruling reaffirms norms in a region where democratic institutions are often fragile [2].
Countries across Latin America have suffered strong-arm dictatorships, and today are faced with a rise in the far right and attempts on their (fragile) democracies – Maduro in Venezuela and Bukele in El Salvador for instance [3]. While Latin America has prosecuted former leaders, no country has previously convicted a politician for attempting a coup [6]. Yet questions about impartiality remain, given the Supreme Court’s pro-Lula composition, despite incriminating evidence. Jair Bolsonaro still holds considerable power with more than 37% of the population arguing that the conviction should not be upheld [4]. Bolsonaro’s enduring influence raises critical questions about the durability of judicial interventions in highly polarised political systems.
The trial raises an essential question: is it an act of political revenge or a triumph of democratic institutions? Historically, Brazil has experienced numerous attempted coups since 1889, but Bolsonaro’s trial is the first to result in a serious conviction, marking a turning point for both national and regional democracy [6].
The most common comparison today is the storming of the Capitol on January 6th 2021, in Washington DC. A key difference lies in the speed of the judicial response: whereas the US courts have been slow to act after January 6, Brazilian courts moved decisively against Bolsonaro’s actions [5]. This contrast prompts reflection on how democratic institutions are valued globally and what constitutes acceptable behaviour.
On a global scale however, this trial raises two major questions. On one hand, it can be seen as the triumph of democracy and the rule of law. El País underlines that in the uncertain and dark times for world democracy, Brazil is sending a powerful message: justice can punish those who infringe upon constitutional order and institutions [4]. The conviction showcases the independence of institutions and their ability to enforce constitutional norms. In theory, it strengthens democracy while deterring future attacks and signalling that no politician is above the law. On the other hand, it arguably deepens polarisation, as Bolsonaro retains a large and loyal base. His supporters denounced the conviction as a ‘witch hunt’ and labelled the left authoritarian [4]. This not only enhances the deep distrust in institutions, it also critically furthers societal divisions potentially causing destabilisation in the not-so-distant future [4].
While Bolsonaro’s conviction represents a clear assertion of judicial authority; it simultaneously exposes the fragility of Brazil’s political consensus. The very action that reinforces constitutional order also risks deepening societal divides, as a significant portion of the population views it as a partisan act rather than an impartial application of justice.
Bolsonaro’s conviction marks a historic affirmation of judicial independence and democratic accountability. Yet it also highlights the persistent challenge of polarisation: safeguarding institutions is only one step towards resilient democracy. As Brazil approaches the 2030 elections, the durability of these interventions will be tested, offering lessons for both national and global democracies facing populist challenges.
Edited by Jules Rouvreau.
References
[1] Ione Wells and Vanessa Buschschlüter, “Brazil’s former President Bolsonaro found guilty of plotting coup” BBC. September 11th, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c147n38k800o. [Accessed September 26th, 2025].
[2] Ione Wells, “Bolsonaro’s coup trial gripped Brazil – and his conviction will divide the country.” BBC. September 11th, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj3yekj2xygo [Accessed September 26th, 2025].
[3] The Economist, “Latin America’s new hard right: Bukele, Milei, Kast and Bolsonaro”. The Economist. April 1st 2024. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2024/04/01/latin-americas-new-hard-right-bukele-milei-kast-and-bolsonaro. [Accessed September 20th, 2025].
[4] The Economist, “America calls Jair Bolsonaro’s conviction a “witch hunt”. The Economist. September 14th, 2025. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2025/09/14/america-calls-jair-bolsonaros-conviction-a-witch-hunt. [Accessed September 24th, 2025].
[5]Vanessa Buschschlüter, “Bolsonaro sentenced to 27 years in jail – what you need to know.” BBC. September 12th, 2025.https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy4d409v2neo [Accessed September 23rd, 2025].
[6] Ione Wells, “How the coup trial of Jair Bolsonaro has divided Brazil”. BBC. September 8th 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn4wx9zlpj5o. [Accessed September 26th, 2025].
[7] Mohamed Metawe; Populism and domestic/international politics: theory and practice. Review of Economics and Political Science 18 June 2024; 9 (3): 194–211. https://doi-org.revproxy.escpeurope.eu/10.1108/REPS-11-2019-0146
[Cover image] “Cadre en métal noir dans la photographie en niveaux de gris”, 2025 (https://unsplash.com/fr/photos/cadre-en-metal-noir-dans-la-photographie-en-niveaux-de-gris-3R_GnBNRVI0) by Tim Hüfner (https://unsplash.com/fr/@huefnerdesign) licensed under Unsplash.com.
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