By Félix Dubé
On 8 October 2025, it was official: Ronaldo, the most followed person on Instagram, became the first billionaire footballer, making him the sixth member of this very exclusive club of athletes who have reached this milestone.
This announcement comes shortly after the footballer inked a new contract extension with Saudi Arabian team Al-Nassr in June, reportedly worth over $400 million and including a 15% stake in the club [1].
This signing is one of many that are rooted in Saudi Arabia’s strategy of investing heavily in sport. Since 2016, Saudi Arabia has spent $51 billion on sports properties [2]. From Formula 1 to golf to boxing to esports, Saudi Arabia has invested in dozens of sports, and not just for the love of the game, but to rebrand its image. This is not solely about athleticism; but also about sportwashing.
Let’s picture the scene: a shining F1 race on the Jeddah Corniche, a LIV Golf tee-off broadcast on television, a parade of football superstars treading the pitches of the Saudi Professional League. The spectacle is grandiose; it is deliberate. It is not just “entertainment”; but also a toolkit.
In the academic literature, sportswashing is “a means by which a country can deflect audiences’ attention away from less favourable perceptions … via a program of investment in sport,” [3] and, more bluntly, “using sports mega-events to launder your reputation on the world stage”. The rise of the term reflects a clear pattern: states deploy sport to distract, reframe, and soften how they are seen abroad.
Saudi Arabia’s civic space is “closed.” Freedoms are systematically restricted, critics are jailed, women face legal discrimination, and migrant workers are routinely exploited [4]. In this context, it makes sense that the Kingdom would want to divert public attention to something much more “eye-catching” than human rights abuses.
This is not a minor element of Saudi Arabia’s strategy, but rather a well-oiled operation.
Looking at the numbers: the Public Investment Fund (PIF) of Saudi Arabia is tasked with turning oil revenue into durable national income. It is one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds, with about $925 billion in assets and $36.8 billion in profits in 2023 [5].
Since 2016, it has invested $51 billion in sports properties, a scale that only makes sense if you see sport as an important component in its development. This strategy is called a “loss leader”: spend heavily on sport to stimulate gains elsewhere and extend influence.
And the pace has quickened. One major investigation by The Guardian tallied $6.3 billion in Saudi sports deals since early 2021, quadrupling previous outlays and reshaping sports markets [6]. Whether in football, golf, or esports, PIF holds contracts and companies in almost every industry in the universe of sport.
It is in the field of esports that Saudi Arabia is proving most aggressive: through the PIF’s Savvy Games Group, the Kingdom has developed a $37.8 billion programme, buying up key esports companies and giving itself the power to organise some of the world’s biggest tournaments [7]. It has even gone so far as to organise the annual esports World Cup, featuring many of the most important esports titles. Even though this World Cup is mostly considered a secondary event by the professional video-game scene and regarded as a “tier 2” tournament, the millions in cash prizes it offers for each game, and the competition between clubs, make this kind of “esports Olympics” a must for many games and the most prestigious clubs [8].
Therefore, besides indulging the crown prince’s hobby, the idea of investing in a sports scene that is undergoing constant transformation allows the Kingdom to secure an important place at the heart of an industry with very high potential, particularly among young people [9].
In addition to this digital core, the state has secured rights in other sports: a 10-year agreement in wrestling with WWE (worth around $1 billion), $35 million in prize money for the Saudi Cup – an annual horse race – and flagship events in chess, tennis, boxing, and snooker.
In motorsport, the portfolio includes Formula E, Dakar/Extreme E, and the F1 Grand Prix (a 10-year contract worth approximately $450 million, plus approximately $65 million per race) [10]. These astronomical sums ensure a sporting calendar centred on Riyadh.
But naturally, when talking about a sports-focused strategy, it is in football that soft power becomes most visible. The acquisition of Newcastle United by the PIF (for approximately $391 million) opened the doors to the Premier League.
In its home country, the PIF took control of four Saudi clubs and launched a wave of superstar transfers (first Ronaldo, then Benzema, Kanté, Firmino, and others), with the aim of developing its internal sporting and economic activity, backed by a declared budget of $2.3 billion for football sponsorship [11].
Finally, there is 2034. After seeing its rivals withdraw, Saudi Arabia emerged as the sole candidate to host the FIFA Men’s World Cup, confirming a tournament that, according to human-rights groups, will take place in a “closed” civic space with ongoing risks for migrant workers. The promise is one of “ultra-modern stadiums and cutting-edge technology”; the fear is that beauty conceals autocratic control [12].
Sceptics might think that “sportswashing” is just a matter of public relations, but it is much more sophisticated. Each event normalises engagement with an authoritarian state by making the partnership commercially and emotionally valuable. As one analysis puts it, it is a “projection of power through consent” [13]: fans want the product, investors want returns, and governments have limited tools, or little desire, to oppose these deals when they are legal and popular.
This leads to a kind of “cultural anaesthesia”: a constant stream of highlights that drowns out headlines about imprisoned critics and restricted freedoms.
Following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, a report was published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, this report demonstrated the “responsibility of the Saudi Arabian State and the involvement of high-level Saudi officials individual liability, including that of the Crown Prince”. The report goes on to state that: “His killing was the result of elaborate planning involving extensive coordination and significant human and financial resources. It was overseen, planned and endorsed by high-level officials. It was premeditated” [14]. In the face of this, Saudi Arabia was briefly shunned, with many major corporations withdrawing or pausing investments in the country. But by 2023–2024, the affair had been purposefully forgotten, with even Joe Biden, who once promised to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah” over the killing, travelling there in 2022 to greet the crown prince [15]. The Kingdom’s cultural importance and influence, particularly through sport, allows it to distance itself from such affairs.
These investments also help promote the image of modernity and dynamism that Saudi Arabia wishes to convey internationally – and to its own youth. Politicians have placed sport at the heart of their Vision 2030 plan, which aims to diversify the economy beyond oil, boost tourism and services, and convince a very young population (around 63% of which are under 30) to invest in a larger national project, to promote the country beyond hydrocarbons.
This is why the government has set up a “Sports for All” programme to encourage participation and create the image of a more open and active society, going so far as to use feminine terminologies in official guidelines to reinforce the idea of inclusion and a modern society [16].
In other words, sport is both a shield and a spear, a protection against criticism and a marker of prosperity for the future. It is a geopolitical strategy to strengthen soft power and influence around the world.
So, is the Kingdom’s strategy bearing fruit? From an economic point of view, certainly: a Premier League club owned by the PIF, a golf giant chaired by the PIF, and the most sought-after sporting event of 2034 already secured. However, in the long term, the outcome will depend on the success of its economic diversification, whether the country sees a boom in tourism and services. Saudi Arabia has also invested in other areas such as aeronautics, real estate and most recently in tech, chip making and ultimately AI data centres, in order to make itself more attractive to tourists and foreign investors [17].
On the other hand, this very aggressive strategy has attracted criticism, particularly that it is mainly a form of sportwashing, and even from the public, who believe that Saudi Arabia is making a name for itself in sport solely for long-term investment purposes.
However the fact is that, due to the negative aspect of “sportwashing”, oil-producing countries, and Saudi Arabia in particular, are finding it difficult to dissociate their investments in other areas such as technology, aviation, aerospace and renewable infrastructure from their poor reputation linked to oil, human rights violations and image laundering. Saudi investments have a much broader objective than simply concealing their past abuses. Their main objective is to improve quality of life and their influence abroad, as can be seen in the HDI Index (Human Development Index). According to Human Rights Reports, Saudi Arabia ranks 37th, surpassed only by European countries and world powers such as the US, Canada, Japan and New Zealand. From 1990 to 2023, Saudi Arabia has significantly increased life expectancy, years of schooling, and GNI per capita, leading to a 34.3% increase in its HDI Index [18]. Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s investments have also led to numerous positive improvements and are not only a means of “washing” its public image.
While analysing Saudi Arabia’s investments in sport, it is clear that these efforts go far beyond the realm of sporting competition. They are part of a broader national project called ‘Vision 2030’ and its ‘Quality of Life’ programme, which aims to diversify the economy, promote social participation and project an image of modernity and openness [19]. This rebranding effort serves not only to attract tourism and investment, but also to legitimise their regimes and divert attention from current humanitarian issues. By hosting global tournaments and acquiring prestigious clubs, the kingdom seeks to reposition itself as a dynamic, forward-looking nation capable of influencing global culture as much as global markets.
Sport thus becomes a tool of soft power, a means for the country to shine abroad, as well as to stimulate its economy and its population.
Edited by Maxime Pierre.
References
[1] Henrique Almeida and Dylan Sloan (2025, 8 October). Ronaldo Becomes First Football Billionaire With Big Saudi Contract
[2] Aaron Ettinger ( 2024, 21 October). More Than Money: The Geopolitics Behind Saudi Arabia’s Sports Strategy https://newsroom.carleton.ca/story/saudi-arabia-strategy-sportswashing/ (Carleton Newsroom)
[3] Fred Frommer. Sportwashing (https://www.britannica.com/money/sportwashing (Britannica Money)
[4] NGOsource (2025, 19 May). Closing Civil Spaces: What ED Tells Us https://www.ngosource.org/closing-civil-spaces-what-ed-tells-us (NGOsource)
[5] Aaron Ettinger ( 2024, 21 October). More Than Money: The Geopolitics Behind Saudi Arabia’s Sports Strategy https://newsroom.carleton.ca/story/saudi-arabia-strategy-sportswashing/ (Carleton Newsroom)
[6] Ruth Michaelson ( 2023, 26 July). Revealed: Saudi Arabia’s $6bn spend on ‘sportswashing’ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/revealed-saudi-arabia-6bn-spend-on-sportswashing (The Guardian)
[7] Grant Liberty (2023). SportsWashing, Saudi Arabia, 2023. https://grantliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/Sportswashing-Saudi-Arabia-2023.pdf (Grant Liberty)
[8] Ben Church (2024, 13 September). A new esports tournament in Saudi Arabia promises to be a game-changer – but it’s also caused division in the industry https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/06/sport/esports-world-cup-saudi-arabia-spt-intl (CNN Sports)
[9]Alexander Lee (2024, 5 June) Why the esports industry is embracing Saudi Arabian investment https://digiday.com/marketing/why-the-esports-industry-is-embracing-saudi-arabian-investment/ (DIGIDAY)
[10] Grant Liberty (2023). SportsWashing, Saudi Arabia, 2023. https://grantliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/Sportswashing-Saudi-Arabia-2023.pdf (Grant Liberty)
[11] Ruth Michaelson ( 2023, 26 July). Revealed: Saudi Arabia’s $6bn spend on ‘sportswashing’ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/revealed-saudi-arabia-6bn-spend-on-sportswashing (The Guardian)
[12] CIVICUS staff (20.Dec.2024). Saudi sportswashing plunges new depths. Decision to host World Cup in authoritarian state bad news for human rights https://lens.civicus.org/saudi-sportswashing-plunges-new-depths/ (CIVICUS LENS)
[13]CIVICUS staff (20.Dec.2024). Saudi sportswashing plunges new depths. Decision to host World Cup in authoritarian state bad news for human rights https://lens.civicus.org/saudi-sportswashing-plunges-new-depths/ (CIVICUS LENS)
[14] Agnes Callamard (19 June, 2019) Khashoggi killing: UN human rights expert says Saudi Arabia is responsible for “premeditated execution” https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/06/khashoggi-killing-un-human-rights-expert-says-saudi-arabia-responsible ( United Nations)
[15] CIVICUS staff (20.Dec.2024). Saudi sportswashing plunges new depths. Decision to host World Cup in authoritarian state bad news for human rights https://lens.civicus.org/saudi-sportswashing-plunges-new-depths/ (CIVICUS LENS)
[16] Stefanie Hausheer Ali and Jaime Stansbury (January 18, 2024). The real reason the Saudi government is investing in sports. Hint: It’s not to impress you. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/saudi-arabia-sportswashing-investment-sports/ (Atlantic Council)
[17] Lim Hui Jie (October 27, 2025). How Saudi Arabia is diversifying away from oil — and betting big on AI https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/28/how-saudi-arabia-is-diversifying-away-from-oil-and-betting-big-on-ai.html (CNBC)
[18] Human Development Reports (May 6, 2025) Human Development Index (HDI) for Saudi Arabia https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/specific-country-data#/countries/SAU (Human Development Reports)
[19] Vision 2030, Quality of Life Program (September 29, 2025) Vision Realization ProgramsQuality of Life Program
https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/explore/programs/quality-of-life-program (Vision 2030)
[Cover image] ““Referee Checking of Golf Stroke”, n.d (https://www.pexels.com/photo/referee-checking-of-golf-stroke-15876968/) by Narsimha Rao Mangu (https://www.pexels.com/@simphotography/) licensed under Pexels (https://www.pexels.com/).
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