By Sossi Tatikyan

The author is a former Armenian diplomat posted to NATO and IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), and a former OSCE and UN political and security governance advisor with experience in Kosovo, Timor-Leste and multiple African countries. She has been consulted by UNDP, EU, DCAF (Geneva-based Security Governance Center) and Freedom House. Her policy and academic work focuses on foreign policy, security governance, Euro-Atlantic integration, small states, ethnic conflicts and information warfare. She holds degrees from Harvard Kennedy School and ESCP and is currently a PhD candidate at Sorbonne Nouvelle.

The release of the 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) signals one of the most comprehensive strategic reorientations in recent American history [1]. It abandons the expansive liberal internationalism of the post–Cold War period and replaces it with a doctrine centred on sovereignty, strategic selectivity, and economic-technological power. Beyond its domestic political symbolism, the NSS has profound implications for Europe, China, emerging markets, and global business environments operating across increasingly securitised economic domains.

I. A Doctrinal Break: The Rise of a Sovereignty-Centred Strategic Framework

At the heart of the NSS lies a clear attempt to redefine US foreign policy through a return to a sovereignty-centred strategic doctrine. The document argues that, for decades, the United States diluted its power through overextension, reliance on multilateral institutions, and a blurred distinction between core interests and peripheral responsibilities. The new strategy attempts to restore conceptual discipline by asserting that the primary goal of US foreign policy is the protection of vital national interests, not the preservation of global order for its own sake.

This reorientation is evident in the emphasis placed on non-interventionism, balance of power, and a reaffirmation of the primacy of nations as the organising units of international politics. The NSS situates this doctrine within a realist tradition that prioritises state sovereignty, rejects universalist expansionism, and favours pragmatic engagement over ideological alignment.

Such a doctrinal turn reflects deeper geopolitical forces: the erosion of unipolarity, the diffusion of technological capabilities, and the fragmentation of global governance. It also marks an attempt to consolidate domestic political legitimacy by framing global engagement through the lens of national economic resilience, cultural cohesion, and strategic autonomy.

II. Principles of the New Strategy: Strength, Restraint, and Realism

The NSS articulates a set of organising principles that operationalise this doctrine. Central among them is the Focused Definition of National Interest, which limits US engagement to domains that directly affect homeland security, economic competitiveness, technological leadership, and the maintenance of favourable regional balances.

Equally important is the principle of Peace Through Strength, which binds diplomatic leverage to military capability, industrial capacity, and technological superiority. Strength is portrayed as the precondition for both stability and credible negotiation.

The NSS also outlines a Predisposition towards Non-Interventionism, setting a high threshold for the use of force and rejecting nation-building and extended deployments. This restraint is complemented by Flexible Realism, which permits cooperation with diverse political models when such cooperation advances US interests. It represents a decisive departure from the post-Cold War belief that international order should be organised around democratic governance. Instead, it embraces a transactional and interest-driven framework in which cooperation with authoritarian states is fully legitimate if it contributes to regional equilibrium, energy security, or technological advantage.

Underlying all these principles is the Primacy of Nations: a view that sovereignty—political, economic, and cultural—must be defended against supranational encroachment. Finally, the NSS advances a renewed commitment to Balance of Power, aimed at preventing the domination of key regions by any adversarial state.

III. US Mediation and the NSS’s Approach to Conflict Resolution

The 2025 NSS highlights a set of US-facilitated agreements that it presents as examples of effective conflict management. The document states that President Trump “secured unprecedented peace” in several conflicts and lists Armenia–Azerbaijan, Cambodia–Thailand, Kosovo–Serbia, Egypt–Ethiopia, the DRC–Rwanda, Pakistan–India, Israel–Iran, as well as ending the war in Gaza with all living hostages returned. These examples are used in the NSS to demonstrate what it portrays as successful US diplomatic problem-solving and to reinforce the strategy’s organising principle of “peace through strength.”

The NSS presents these agreements as evidence of direct, high-level US engagement capable of producing rapid outcomes. By highlighting these cases, the document contrasts its approach with broader multilateral frameworks and positions such US-brokered settlements as part of its overall emphasis on sovereignty, strong leadership, and clear national interests. The strategy does not elaborate on the institutional mechanisms behind these agreements nor on their long-term implementation, but it uses them to illustrate what it frames as a pragmatic and results-oriented model of American diplomacy. The NSS thus signals a growing divergence between US and EU philosophies of conflict resolution, with practical implications for the coherence of Western approaches to crises across Europe, the Middle East, and the wider neighbourhood.

IV. Regional Priorities in a Restructured US Strategic Landscape

The NSS outlines a striking rebalancing of US global priorities. The Western Hemisphere is elevated to the foremost external priority, reactivating a modernised Monroe Doctrine, reinforced with “Trump Corollary [2].”  The US seeks to limit extra-regional influence, stabilise neighbouring states, and secure critical supply chains within the hemisphere. This reflects growing concern about Chinese presence in Latin America, transnational criminal networks, and the fragility of migration governance.

In the Indo-Pacific, the strategy highlights maritime security, technological competition, and the resilience of global supply chains. Though not explicitly named, China is clearly framed as the central strategic competitor—not only militarily but also in the spheres of digital infrastructure, industrial policy, and global regulatory standards.

The Middle East and Africa are framed primarily through the imperatives of stability, energy security, and control of critical maritime passages. The NSS underscores the need to prevent hostile actors from gaining influence over key strategic routes, while avoiding protracted military commitments. Although the document does not specify these passages, it implicitly refers to the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal—vital corridors for global shipping and hydrocarbon flows. Rather than advancing transformational agendas, the US approach prioritises counterterrorism, maintenance of regional balance, and protection of international trade and energy supply lines.

V. Europe and NATO in the NSS: Between Civilisational Vulnerability and Strategic Rebalancing 

Tone and Framing of the NSS Towards Europe

The tone of the 2025 NSS towards Europe is markedly direct, often critical, and framed through a sense of strategic urgency. Rather than employing the traditional language of transatlantic solidarity, the document adopts a corrective posture, arguing that Europe faces a profound internal crisis marked by demographic decline, governance weaknesses, and civilizational loss of confidence. It presents the continent’s vulnerabilities as self-inflicted and warns that they could undermine Europe’s future reliability as a partner. The NSS also underscores that the United States will no longer compensate for European shortfalls, insisting that European states must assume far greater responsibility for their own security and strategic direction. This sharper tone does not signal disengagement; rather, it reflects an expectation that Europe undergo political, economic, and cultural renewal to remain a capable ally within a rebalanced transatlantic partnership.

Europe’s “Internal Crisis” and “Civilizational Fragility”

The 2025 NSS portrays Europe not merely as a partner constrained by capability gaps, but as a continent facing a profound civilisational crisis. Its challenges are framed as structural and internal rather than external: demographic contraction, weakened national identities, regulatory systems that inhibit innovation, and migration policies that strain social cohesion. The document highlights what it describes as “eroding political liberty,” suppression of opposition, and an overreliance on supranational governance that, in its view, undermines national sovereignty. These trends collectively contribute to a broader “loss of cultural self-confidence.” If left unaddressed, the NSS warns, parts of Europe may become unrecognisable within two decades, lacking the economic or military foundations required to serve as reliable allies.

The strategy consistently refers to “Europe” rather than the European Union, a deliberate rhetorical choice that signals a critical attitude towards supranational institutions and a preference for viewing the continent through the sovereignty, responsibility, and agency of individual nation-states. Europe’s renewal—political, economic, and cultural—is therefore treated not as an internal European matter but as a strategic priority for the United States. The NSS states that Washington “wants Europe to remain European,” regain civilisational confidence, and reverse trajectories that have diminished its geopolitical relevance. This signals a notable shift in transatlantic discourse: Europe is valued not only for its strategic geography or economic capacity but as a civilisational pillar whose internal strength is seen as essential to sustaining Western power.

NATO, Burden-Sharing, and the End of Perpetual Expansion

The NSS introduces a sharp recalibration of expectations within NATO. It asserts that the United States will no longer carry a disproportionate share of the burdens underpinning the international system and expects affluent, capable allies to assume primary responsibility for security in their own regions. The Hague Commitment—requiring NATO members to spend 5 percent of GDP on defence—is presented as the new benchmark that allies must meet. The United States positions itself as convener and supporter rather than the primary guarantor, signalling a shift from American dominance to a more distributed defence architecture.

This approach is combined with a structural critique of NATO’s trajectory. The NSS calls for “ending the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance.” This marks a decisive departure from the post–Cold War logic of open-ended enlargement and reflects a broader emphasis on stabilising the Euro-Atlantic space rather than extending it. By conditioning deeper US support on European responsibility, defence investment, export-control alignment, and willingness to shoulder regional security burdens, the NSS places NATO within a transactional framework consistent with its sovereignty-centred doctrine.

Russia, Ukraine, and the Need for Strategic Stability

The NSS presents Europe’s relationship with Russia as profoundly strained in the context of the war in Ukraine, noting that many European states continue to regard Russia as an existential threat despite having far greater conventional military strength. It argues that managing this relationship and restoring “strategic stability across the Eurasian continent” will require sustained US diplomatic engagement. The document also links Europe’s internal political fragility to its external posture, pointing to “unstable minority governments” that suppress opposition and fail to reflect widespread public demand for peace. It further notes that the continuation of the war has increased Europe’s external dependencies, citing Germany’s turn to Chinese markets and Russian energy sources to offset domestic shortages.

The NSS identifies as a core US interest the negotiation of an “expeditious cessation of hostilities” in Ukraine, both to reduce escalation risks and to stabilise European economies. Ending active conflict is also framed as essential for enabling Ukraine’s reconstruction and ensuring its survival as a viable state. Within this vision, the United States aims to prevent Russian domination of Europe while encouraging European governments to assume primary responsibility for their own security and for the long-term management of relations with Moscow.

The Economic Dimension: Europe’s Decline and US Expectations

The NSS underscores Europe’s economic deterioration—continental Europe’s decline from 25 percent of global GDP in 1990 to 14 percent today—as a central strategic concern. It attributes this erosion to burdensome regulatory frameworks, low productivity growth, and political dysfunction. For Washington, reversing Europe’s stagnation is essential because the United States depends on strong, capable, confident, democratic allies. Transatlantic trade and technological cooperation are framed as pillars of global prosperity, but only if Europe recovers its innovative capacity and institutional vitality.

The strategy emphasises the need for deeper market access for US businesses, fair treatment of American workers, and a revitalised European commitment to competitiveness. It highlights the importance of strengthening “healthy nations” in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe through commercial ties, defence cooperation, and cultural exchange—reflecting a belief that these regions may become the engines of Europe’s renewal.

Europe–China Relations

Though the section on Europe does not explicitly frame China as Europe’s principal challenge, the broader NSS strongly implies that European exposure to Chinese investment, industrial overcapacity, and technological dependencies creates structural vulnerabilities. The strategy expects European governments to adopt firmer positions on Chinese mercantilist practices, technological theft, and cyber espionage, and to align their export controls with those of the United States. European companies deepening their dependence on Chinese supply chains—such as German industries relocating production to China using Russian energy—are presented as symptoms of Europe’s strategic incoherence.

In this sense, Europe becomes part of the global competition with China not by choice, but by structural implication. Washington expects Europe to reduce critical dependencies, harden technological ecosystems, and treat economic security as integral to sovereign decision-making. This aligns with the 2025 NSS’s overarching emphasis on resilient supply chains, industrial security, and technological sovereignty.

VI. Global Economic and Business Implications

The 2025 NSS articulates a strategic environment in which economic policy and national security are no longer treated as separate domains. Instead, the document frames global commerce through a lens of strategic rivalry, industrial sovereignty, and the protection of critical technologies. For international business, this marks a continuation—and acceleration—of trends that have been reshaping global markets since the late 2010s but are now embedded as core pillars of US statecraft.

At the centre of the NSS is a coordinated effort to rebuild domestic industrial capacity, restructure global supply-chain dependencies, and impose new standards for technological governance. The strategy’s emphasis on reshoring and “revitalising American industry” signals that the United States intends to reduce exposure to geopolitical shocks, supply disruptions, and reliance on strategic competitors, particularly in advanced manufacturing, digital infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, energy systems, and defence-related technologies. This orientation affects firms operating across transatlantic, Indo-Pacific, and Eurasian markets by tightening the policy link between market access and geopolitical alignment.

The NSS also codifies the politicisation of supply chains as a permanent feature of the business environment. Companies are expected to map vulnerabilities, diversify production, and comply with more stringent origin, transparency, and cybersecurity requirements. Sectors such as semiconductors, AI, telecommunications equipment, quantum technologies, biotechnology, and critical minerals are explicitly treated as national-security assets. Firms engaged in these sectors will encounter expanded export controls, investment-screening mechanisms, and regulatory frameworks designed to prevent transfer of sensitive technologies to strategic competitors.

A parallel trend is the emergence of rival regulatory spheres, as the US insists that partners align their export controls, data-governance frameworks, and technology standards with American systems. This has major implications for Europe, where existing regulatory philosophies—particularly regarding data protection, competition policy, and digital markets—may increasingly collide with US expectations of strategic coordination. For multinational companies, this suggests a future in which regulatory fragmentation intensifies and operational compliance becomes more complex, especially for firms with exposure to both Western and Chinese markets.

The NSS also reinforces the strategic value of critical minerals, whose extraction, processing, and secure transportation underpin green-energy transitions and advanced manufacturing. Businesses in mining, clean energy, automotive, aerospace, and microelectronics will face new pressures to ensure resilient sourcing, including partnerships with politically aligned states. As the US seeks to reduce dependence on China’s dominance in mineral supply chains, companies can expect incentives for diversification, as well as closer scrutiny of environmental, governance, and labour standards.

Finally, the document connects economic resilience with geopolitical alignment, offering the possibility of preferential access, technology sharing, and deeper commercial cooperation to states that conform to US strategic expectations. For the private sector, this means that market opportunities will increasingly reflect geopolitical choices made by governments. Businesses operating in countries viewed as strategic partners may benefit from enhanced investment flows, technology transfer, and regulatory collaboration; those situated in ambiguous or adversarial environments may face new restrictions or competitive disadvantages.

For global firms, the 2025 NSS ultimately signals a shift towards a world in which industrial policy, security strategy, and geopolitical alignment shape competitive advantage. Navigating this landscape will require anticipating regulatory divergence, managing political risk across competing spheres of influence, and building operational resilience in an era where economics and security are institutionally merged.

VII. Conclusion

The 2025 NSS represents more than a change in American foreign policy; it is a conceptual shift in how the United States interprets its role in a fragmenting world order. Its sovereignty-centred doctrine, strategic recalibration, and emphasis on economic-technological resilience will shape global geopolitics and international business for years to come. Above all, the NSS positions Europe as a strategically indispensable but internally vulnerable partner whose renewal is essential for the stability of the wider West—requiring European states to assume greater responsibility, correct structural weaknesses, and strengthen their capacity to act within an increasingly competitive international environment.

Edited by Maxime Pierre, Olle Olsson Holmquist, Jules Rouvreau.

References

[1]: National Security Strategy of the United States of America November 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf 

[2]: The Monroe Doctrine, announced in 1823, declared the Americas off-limits to new European interference, positioning the United States as the protector of newly independent Latin American states amid shifting great-power dynamics and European ambitions. Source: Weiss, J. (2024). The Imperial Paradox of the Monroe Doctrine. Webster Review of International History. https://websterreview.lse.ac.uk/articles/73/files/67a3db13f282c.pdf 

[Cover image] “Silouette photo of warship”, n.d (https://www.pexels.com/photo/silhouette-photo-of-warship-2961960/) by Athena Sandrini (https://www.pexels.com/@athena/) licensed under Pexels.com.