By Jacques Jourdain de Thieulloy

The Pentagon’s new National Defence Strategy (NDS)[1] marks a structural shift in US security policy. The document explicitly assumes that Washington can no longer simultaneously dominate all strategic theatres and opts for a more selective doctrine based on prioritising threats and redistributing responsibilities in an environment marked by simultaneous crises, the risk of geopolitical escalation and industrial base constraints.

The US comparative advantage no longer lies in maintaining advanced military omnipresence but is redefined as the ability to shape the strategic environment, mobilise alliances, strengthen industrial capacity and deny competitors the possibility of forcibly altering regional balances. Instead of maintaining a constant presence in all scenarios, the new strategy focuses on deterrence based on denial, productive scale and the selective integration of allies[2]. The national territory and the Western Hemisphere are now conceived as an integrated strategic theatre; China is reaffirmed as the main systemic challenge[3]; and burden-sharing, co-production and supply chain resilience are elevated to strategic pillars. However, the text retains operational ambiguities and avoids specifying budget figures, which limits its usefulness as a guide for implementation.

The NDS is presented around three principles[4] — ‘America first,’ ‘peace through strength’ and ‘common sense’ — which reflect a more pragmatic and less grandiose approach than previous strategies. The document distances itself from the aspiration to uphold an international order, that it describes as an ‘unrealistic abstraction’ responsible, in its view, for the strategic overextension of the United States in recent decades. Faced with this diagnosis, the new strategy does not seek to preserve or reform the inherited order, but rather to redefine priorities, limit commitments and adapt the exercise of power to a more competitive and fragmented context.

Rather than promising security on all fronts, the NDS recognises the need to choose, prioritise and delegate. US leadership is no longer conceived as a permanent global presence, but rather as the ability to deny strategic advantages to rivals, sustain deterrence and manage competition without causing systemic collapse. The shift implies a redefinition of the United States: from default security provider to the architect of a more selective and hierarchical system.

The document is structured around four priorities. The first is the defence of US territory and the Western Hemisphere as a single integrated strategic theatre. This concept includes missile defence, cyber resilience, nuclear modernisation, Arctic access, and protection of critical points such as Alaska, Greenland, and the Panama Canal. The hemisphere is defined as an indispensable logistical and industrial base for any global projection, and the presence of rivals in the region is redefined as a form of direct interference in national security.

The second priority is deterrence against China, which is considered the main systemic challenge. The strategy proposes controlled competitive posture based on denial deterrence and the reinforcement of a defensive architecture along the First Island Chain, with the aim of preventing coercive changes to the status quo. At the same time, military channels of communication remain open, and strategic ambiguity is preserved — including the absence of explicit reference to Taiwan—to avoid unwanted escalation.

Thirdly, the NDS institutionalises a more structural distribution of burdens. The United States is moving towards a model that delegates regional primacy, while tying the level of autonomy and access to its support granted to allies to their strategic reliability, defence spending, and industrial alignment. The fourth priority is the mobilisation of the industrial base as a central pillar of deterrence. Security and reindustrialisation are presented as inseparable vectors: supply-chain resilience, artificial intelligence and co-production between allies are integrated under a logic of conditionality that is also reflected in the new “America First” arms-transfer strategy [5]. Exports are no longer mere commercial instruments but have become tools for political pressure and industrial strengthening, prioritising partners who assume greater costs and responsibilities.

The tone of the document is more political and partisan than technical [6], as is often the case in the Trump administration. In several passages, it serves as an ideological reaffirmation — with explicit criticism of the Biden administration — rather than a detailed operational guide. Although it declares the defence of the territory and the Western Hemisphere a priority, it does not clarify the specific impact on the deployment of forces or delimit the use of military instruments in domestic tasks related to border security, drug trafficking, or migration.

The strategy reduces the centrality of traditional scenarios. Russia is described as a persistent but manageable threat, with emphasis on the nuclear, cyber and space dimensions, while the burden of conventional deterrence shifts towards Europe. North Korea is addressed primarily from a regional perspective and in terms of the direct risk to US territory. The document also avoids a realistic budgetary discussion despite proposing ambitious modernisation programmes — such as the Golden Dome, naval and nuclear expansion and industrial revitalisation — gives  Islamist terrorism a secondary place, and omits recent lessons from conflicts such as those in Ukraine and the Middle East.

The NDS also reveals internal tensions. It recognises that geography no longer guarantees security against missiles and hybrid threats, but advocates a hemispheric retreat that seems to assume a renewed continental ‘sanctuary’. And although it promises to put an end to interventionism, it maintains a logic of coercion redefined under the umbrella of hemispheric security. The shift towards territorial defence thus raises a question: whether it reflects coherent strategic realism or  an internal political agenda that could entail high strategic costs without a clear review of global resources and commitments.

Intellectually driven in part by Elbridge Colby [7], the strategy is based on the premise that defence policy must once again be anchored in geography [8], power and industrial capacity. The Indo-Pacific is positioned as the centre of gravity of the global balance [9], and deterrence is redefined as the effective denial of the adversary’s objectives, rather than merely the threat of retaliation. The United States assumes that it can no longer simultaneously sustain global primacy and manage multiple crises without facing material limits, and proposes a narrower hierarchy of priorities and selective leadership supported by allies willing to shoulder real burdens.

For Europe, the message is unequivocal [10]. The transatlantic relationship is shifting from an almost automatic commitment to a logic of strategic performance. Russia is no longer the organising axis of US force design, and Europeans will have to accelerate their rearmament, strengthen their industrial base, and demonstrate budgetary credibility if they want to preserve Washington’s support. Otherwise, the alliance could become a more conditional and transactional form of cooperation.

The strategy does, however, entail risks for the United States. Without coherent budgetary decisions and a clear reduction in commitments, it could remain mere rhetoric. And if allies do not respond to the demand to assume greater responsibilities, Washington could find itself caught between a withdrawal that weakens global deterrence and a new overextension that perpetuates its structural vulnerabilities. The real scope of the strategic shift that the Pentagon has just formalised is at stake in this tension.

Edited by Félix Dubé

References

[1], [4] : U.S. Department of Defense, 2026 National Defense Strategy, 23 January 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF

[2] :  Elbridge Colby, Remarks at the Sejong Institute, U.S. Department of War (official transcript),2026. https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4389207/remarks-by-under-secretary-of-war-for-policy-elbridge-colby-at-the-sejong-insti/

[3] : Reuters, cited in Al Jazeera, “US army says homeland, curbing China priorities, limited support for allies,” 24 January 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/24/us-army-says-homeland-curbing-china-priorities-limited-support-for-allies

[5] The White House, “Establishing an America First arms transfer strategy”, 6 February 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/establishing-an-america-first-arms-transfer-strategy/

[6] U.S. Department of War, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth addresses general and flag officers at Quantico, Virginia”, 30 September 2025. https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4318689/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-addresses-general-and-flag-officers-at-quantico-v/

[7], [10] Real Instituto Elcano, “La Estrategia de Defensa Nacional de EEUU 2026”, 23 February 2026. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/la-estrategia-de-defensa-nacional-de-eeuu-2026/

[8] ESCP International Politics Society, “The 2025 US National Security Strategy: A Sovereignty-Centred Shift and Its Global Implications for Europe and Beyond”, 8 December 2025. 

[9] U.S. Department of Defense, 2026 National Security Strategy, November 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

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