Since November 2023, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has become the scene of a sustained campaign of attacks on commercial shipping. The Houthis, who control much of northern Yemen as well as the capital city Sanaa, is the perpetrator. The armed movement, supported militarily and politically by Iran, began targeting ships in the Red Sea after the outbreak of the war in Gaza, claiming that they were acting in support of the Palestinians and would strike vessels linked to Israel, the United States, or the United Kingdom. In practice, however, ships with no clear connection to the conflict have also been threatened or hit.
The attacks have involved ballistic missiles, drones, and unmanned boats. According to the United States Maritime Administration, more than 100 separate attacks on commercial vessels affected ships from over 60 countries between November 2023 and October 2025. The threat has since re-emerged: in August 2026, the tankers Amzan and Daisy were reportedly struck by Houthi missiles off the Saudi coast. These attacks have forced many shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea and take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, adding days and fuel costs to journeys between Asia and Europe.[1]
The attacks are therefore more than a regional security crisis. They show how a relatively small armed movement can exploit the geography of a strategic waterway and disrupt one of the world’s main commercial routes. To understand why attacks in Yemen can affect shipping, energy supplies, and prices far beyond the Middle East, one must first understand what makes Bab el-Mandeb such an important chokepoint.
Its Arabic name means “the gate of tears.” The Bab el-Mandeb Strait separates the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa and controls the southern entrance to the Red Sea. It is one of those narrow passages on which a considerable share of what we consume depends – almost 15% of global trade and 30% of worldwide container traffic. Its geography and the transit figures for vessels passing through it are enough to explain why it ranks among the chokepoints of global trade.[2]
A strait with the geographical features of a bottleneck
The strait stretches for roughly fifty kilometres and is approximately thirty-two kilometres wide, between Ras Menheli Cape in Yemen and Ras Siyyan Cape in Djibouti. The volcanic island of Mayyoun, known to Europeans as Perim, is less than six kilometres long and covers an area of thirteen square kilometres within the strait; dividing it into two very unequal passages. To the east, on the Yemeni side, the small channel known as Bab Iskender is only three kilometres wide and around thirty metres deep. Its tidal currents are strong and irregular, and it is reserved for local shipping. To the west lies the main passage, the Dact-el-Mayun, roughly twenty kilometres wide and more than three hundred metres deep. It is through this passage that the bulk of international trade passes.
This depth is crucial. A strait is an obstacle only if it is narrow or shallow. The main passage of Bab el-Mandeb is neither, at least to any significant degree. Its depth of three hundred metres and width of around twenty kilometres allow the largest vessels — including giant container ships and supertankers — to pass without draught restrictions or delicate manoeuvring. Unlike the Suez Canal, which requires ships to travel in single file at reduced speed (naturally, as it is a human-built canal), or the Strait of Malacca, obstructed by shoals, Bab el-Mandeb does not physically impede navigation. Its power as a chokepoint lies not in its geometry, but in its position.
The Red Sea Lock
Because this strait is the unavoidable gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea — and therefore the antechamber to the Suez Canal [3]. A ship coming from Asia and seeking to reach the Mediterranean via Suez must necessarily pass through Bab el-Mandeb: it is the Red Sea’s only southern entrance. The two passages — the natural strait and the artificial canal — form one and the same system, more than 1,800 kilometres apart, yet inseparable. Closing one renders the other useless. And it is this system that carries the shortest maritime route from Asia to Europe (and viceversa), avoiding the lengthy detour around Africa.
The figures for the Suez Canal convey the scale of what is at stake. Under normal conditions, it carries between 12 and 15% of global trade, nearly 30% of worldwide container traffic and approximately 9% of seaborne oil shipments. More than 20,000 vessels use it every year – 26,434 in 2023 [3]. The Yemeni strait is therefore the canal’s geographical prerequisite, and its closure would have the same effect as a blockade of Suez itself.
The alternative route and the number of days
Is there another route? Only one: around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, the route discovered by Vasco Da Gama and used by ships before the Suez Canal was opened in 1869. This is where the strait’s value can be measured in sailing days. Via Suez – and therefore Bab el-Mandeb – a container ship can travel from Asia to northern Europe in around thirty days. Via the Cape of Good Hope, an additional ten to fourteen days bring the total journey to forty or fifty days. Two extra weeks at sea mean a considerable increase in fuel consumption, delivery times extended by the same amount, stocks tied up for longer, and ship rotations disrupted. A single container ship operating the Asia – Europe loop consequently completes fewer voyages each year, effectively removing transport capacity from the global market.
It is this arithmetic of time that gives Bab el-Mandeb its strategic value. The strait is not spectacular: no locks, no engineering works, no dizzying bottleneck. It is wide, deep, and easy to navigate. Yet, its geography embodies the difference between thirty and fifty days at sea, between the short route and the great detour. Like Hormuz [4] for Gulf oil or Malacca [5] for Far Eastern trade, it belongs to that handful of passages whose control determines the rhythm of global commerce, and whose mere existence reminds us that the most globalised trade still rests on a few waterways.
Bab el-Mandeb in figures :
| Length | ≈ 50 km |
| Width | ≈ 32 km (Ras Menheli / Ras Siyyan) |
| Western section/ Wide pass : Dact-el-Mayun | ≈ 20 km wide, > 300 m deep |
| Eastern section/ Narrow Pass : Bab Iskender | 3 km wide, ≈ 30 m deep |
| Via Suez | 12–15 per cent of world trade, ≈ 30 per cent of containers, ≈ 9 per cent of oil; 26,434 ships (2023) |
| Detour via the Cape of Good Hope | +10 to 14 days (30 → 40–50 days) |
Edited by Adrian Kai Fraile Itagaki.
References
[1] U.S. Maritime Administration. (2026, September). 2026-013—Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Somali Basin: Houthi attacks on commercial vessels. U.S. Department of Transportation. https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-013-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-gulf-aden-arabian-sea-and-somali-basin-houthi-attacks
[2] Deutsche Welle. (2026). Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Taiwan Strait: When shipping routes become geopolitical weapons. https://www.dw.com/en/strait-of-hormuz-strait-of-malacca-taiwan-strait-iran-war-economy-shipping/a-77108496
[3] Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Suez Canal. In Wikipedia. Retrieved September 30, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Canal
[4] Funaiole, M. P., Prétat, H., Powers-Riggs, A., & Verschuur, J. (2026, April 22). The Strait of Hormuz in 8 charts. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/strait-hormuz-8-charts
[5] National Bureau of Asian Research. (2023, October 5). Geoeconomic crossroads: The Strait of Malacca’s impact on regional trade. https://www.nbr.org/publication/geoeconomic-crossroads-the-strait-of-malaccas-impact-on-regional-trade/
[Cover picture] Skilla1st. (2017, February 2). Bab-el-Mandeb [Map]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bab-el-Mandeb.png
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