Transnistria is a narrow strip of land situated between Ukraine and Moldova, formally part of the latter even if, de facto. it seceded more than 30 years ago. Covering about 4,000 square kilometres, with around 367,000 residents registered by Moldovan authorities [1], Transnistria represents one of the many emblematic of the frozen conflicts present in the post-Soviet space.
According to the 2015 census, Russians, Moldovans, and Ukrainians each made up between a fifth and a third of the population [2]. The breakaway republic has three official languages: Russian, Moldovan (written in the Cyrillic alphabet, unlike the rest of Moldova), and Ukrainian, although Russian dominates public life. In the region, flags with the hammer and sickle still wave and big statues of Lenin adorn public squares as if the USSR had never died. A lot of foreign commentators have described this breakaway republic as the last piece of the USSR, surviving even if the reality is definitely more complicated than this. Behind the Soviet façade, the economy is dominated by a single private conglomerate, and the current president, Vadim Krasnoselsky, describes himself as a constitutional monarchist who looks to the Russian Empire, rather than the USSR, as his model [3][4].
This conflict was born from the dissolution of the USSR. On 2 September 1990, when Moldova was still a Soviet republic inside the USSR, the local leaders of the eastern bank of the Dnestr river proclaimed the “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic”, opposing linguistic reforms introduced by Chișinău, like the adoption of the Latin alphabet, and fearing a potential reunification with Romania. The goal of this separatist movement was to exit from a more and more independent Moldova, in order to remain inside the Soviet rule. Moldova, by contrast, declared its own independence from the Soviet Union almost a year later, on 27 August 1991. Unfortunately for the separatists, the house that they were trying to stay in was crumbling and the USSR collapsed before their plan could succeed.
Between 1990 and 1992 the conflict developed in multiple phases. At first, from 1990 to 1991 the fight was more on an institutional level: the newly formed Moldovan government declared the secession illegitimate, while in the Transnistrian region local militias started to form. In the area around Dubasari (a city on Transnistria’s border with the rest of Moldova, 40 kilometres from Chișinău) the first sporadic fights erupted and after the international recognition of Moldovan independence in 1992, the crisis entered its peak phase. Chișinău tried to re-establish control over the breakaway state, but the militias in Transnistria, supported by the 14th Russian Army, bombed the Moldovan positions making these attempts vain. Moscow justified the action as necessary to protect the Russian-speaking population and its own military personnel, while Chișinău denounced it as clear military interference. On 21 July 1992, Moldova and Russia, in the presence of the Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, signed a ceasefire agreement establishing a security zone controlled by Russian, Transnistrian and Moldovan peacekeeping forces, effectively freezing the conflict.
Since then, Transnistria has remained a non-recognised state which still functions, with its own currency (the Transnistrian Ruble, a currency issued by the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank), passport, parliament (a unicameral chamber with 33 seats) and institutions, while Moldova continues to assert its sovereignty over the territory.
The history of the Transnistrian ruble mirrors that of the republic itself. After the dissolution of the USSR, since the region continued to accept the old Soviet banknotes, it was flooded with pieces of paper from the entire Soviet space. In order to protect the economy, the Transnistrian authorities started applying stickers with General Suvorov (a general from the Russian Empire who founded Tiraspol) on the old banknotes [5]. In 1994, the Transnistrian Bank started printing a new ruble that quickly suffered from high inflation, forcing the central bank to issue notes with ever larger denominations, up to 500,000 rubles. In 2000, a new currency replaced it at a rate of one million to one [5].
Since Transnistria didn’t have a mint to manufacture and issue the coins and bills on its own, Tiraspol turned to the Mint of Poland in Warsaw, that agreed to deliver the service, and quickly the things spiraled down to a diplomatic crisis. Following this, Moldova accused Poland of supporting the separatists since they feared that this act could symbolize a de-facto recognition of the state [6]. The Mint of Poland argued that the accusations were unfounded, in fact, since the Transnistrian ruble is not recognized as legitimate currency, they were technically minting just tokens, not coins. The tipping point of the crisis arrived in November 2005, when Ukrainian customs seized a shipment carrying 8 million Transnistrian rubles near the western city of Lviv and handed them over to Moldova, which protested once again to Warsaw. Warsaw distanced itself, with the Polish embassy in Chișinău stressing that the mint was not a state institution but a private company working on commercial terms, and the mint’s management announced it would try to withdraw from the contract [6].
Transnistria decided at this point to create a mint of their own, with their own metal coins [7]. In 2014 it also introduced plastic coins that its own mint could not produce; developed and manufactured in Russia by Goznak, the Russian state printer [8], each with a different shape according to its value: round for 1 ruble, square for 3 rubles, a pentagon for 5 rubles, and an hexagon for 10 rubles. This type of plastic coins had similar anti-counterfeiting features to the one that protects the authenticity of banknotes, such as a textured surface with raised elements that can be felt by touch, microtext, fibres that glow under ultraviolet light [9][10], and became a popular curiosity among collectors.

Transnistrian plastic coins.
For Moscow, the region had become a strategic leverage against Moldova. In fact, considering it is not necessary to annex a region in order to control it, Moscow found that it sufficed to maintain it in a state of political limbo which would make it impossible for Moldova to stabilise itself completely and making it vulnerable to Russian pressure. A main Russian lever in the region are the 1500 soldiers of the Operational Group of Russian Forces (the successor of the Soviet 14th Army, mostly made out of recruited Transnistrians holding Russian passports and Russians [11][13), stationed today in the region. They guard the Cobasna depot, one of the largest ammunition stores in Eastern Europe, holding an estimated 20,000 tonnes of Soviet-era munitions just two kilometres from the Ukrainian border [12]. In April 2026, Moldova declared the commanders of this contingent undesirable [11][14].
The Transnistrian crisis was not the only time that Moldova had to deal with breakaway movements inside its own territory. Gagauzia is an autonomous region in the south of the country, inhabited by a population that traditionally speaks a Turkic language and practices Orthodox Christianity. It proclaimed unilateral independence in 1990 for similar reasons to Transnistria. In this case however, the crisis did not degenerate into an open war and it was resolved thanks to a political compromise. In fact, in 1994, the region was granted large autonomy with its own institutions and language recognition. Today Gagauzia, even if it is still politically oriented towards Russia and against European integration, it is not in an open conflict with the state and it does not represent a threat to the national integrity of the Moldovan state.
Moldova in these years has progressively orientated its own political framework towards the European Union by joining the Eastern Partnership in 2009, signing an association agreement with the European Union in 2014, and, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, applying for EU membership under the pro-European government of President Maia Sandu, who was re-elected in 2024 for a second term, and has identified Russia as a major threat to Moldovan sovereignty [15]. In particular she said: “The greatest danger of Russia’s interference in our internal affairs is that it poses a direct threat to our country’s national security, sovereignty, and European future” [16].
With the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Transnistria returned to the spotlight of the international community due to its strategic position on the western flank of Ukraine and its stable presence of Russian troops inside. A few weeks after the start of the Russian invasion, the president of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, presented on national television a military map on which was shown, among other lines of the advance, a possible operational axis extending from Transnistria towards Odesa, fueling fears of a land link between Russian forces and the separatist region, and the opening of a new front in southwestern Ukraine [17]. Even if this scenario never came to be, the episode made clear to everyone, in particular Ukraine, how that small strip of land was dangerous when used by Russia as a tool to control the countries of the post-Soviet area.
In order also to understand how this strange state works it is essential to examine the economic and political structure of Transnistria. At the center there is a private holding called Sheriff, founded in 1993 by former Soviet police officers Viktor Gušan and Il’ja Kazmaly [18][19]. The company, in just a few years, has expanded its presence to almost everything there is in the state: supermarkets, fuelling stations, banking services, telecommunications operator, printing, advertisement, constructions, cognacs, wine, a medical center, an hotel complex, and even the football club of Tiraspol (the capital of Transnistria) Sheriff FC [18]. According to official data Sheriff employs approximately 13,000 people, that is around 17% of the workers in the region, and the taxes it pays make up 32% of Transnistria’s total tax revenues [18]. Transnistria is almost essentially a fief of Sheriff; the state is one of their assets.
Even the current leader of Transnistria, Vadim Krasnoselsky, is a former employee of Sheriff [20]. Vadim Krasnoselsky was born in the far east of the USSR and moved to the region in 1978 when his father, a military officer, was transferred there [4]. After a career in the Transnistrian police that culminated as Minister of the Interior, he left government in 2012 with the rank of general and spent three years as an adviser to Interdnestrcom, the region’s only mobile operator, affiliated with the Sheriff holding [4]. In 2016, he won the presidential election with 62% [21] of the vote and the backing of Sheriff. He was re-elected in 2021 with 79% of the votes in an election monitored only by observers from Russia including deputies from the Russian Duma (the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia) [22]. Despite the fact that he is supposed to govern what is usually called the last piece of the USSR, Krasnoselsky has declared himself “a monarchist by nature” [3]. “I am a supporter of monarchism, of limited constitutional monarchism, and I take the experience of the Russian Empire as a basis, ” Krasnoselsky says [4].
Vadim Krasnoselsky himself could be considered as a personification of Transnistria: born as a Soviet citizen, grew up near oligarchs, and now a declared monarchist in a state that only officially has the hammer and the sickle on the flag.
The other pillar on which the Transnistrian economy is built-on is subsidized Russian gas that reaches the region thanks to a pipeline that connects it to Russia through Ukraine.
Things changed between 2024 and 2025, when Kyiv decided to not renew the deal of transit of Russian gas, and Russian-owned Gazprom closed every connection with Moldova in order to put pressure on the pro-European government and the incoming elections in which the Kremlin supported the pro-Russian opposition [23]. By cutting the flux of energy to Moldova also the region on the east side of the Dnestr was cut off from its biggest source of energy. In fact, Transnistria has depended on this gas not only for heating and for domestic use, but it was also essential to power the Moldavskaya GRES power station in Cuciurgan, that was used to produce 80% of the entire electricity consumed inside Moldova [24]. The impact of the cut of this umbilical cord, which had made it possible for Transnistria to survive for more than three decades, was brutal. Within a week, heating and warm water were cut in approximately 51000 homes, and 1500 flats stayed without heating in the middle of the winter [24]. The GDP of the region is estimated to have fallen by 23.2% in just the first semester of that year, and industrial production also fell by 32.8%, while exports dropped by 42% in the first 10 months [25].
In geopolitics every hole in a sphere of influence is always immediately filled by another power, and the EU moved quickly to secure the vacant place for themselves. In January 2025, the European Commission announced an emergency package of 30 million euros, of which 10 million was earmarked for electricity purchases for the right bank of the Dnestr, and the remaining 20 million for emergency gas purchases [26]. On 4 February 2025, the Commission and Moldova agreed a two-year Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience worth 250 million euros for 2025, including a further 100 million euros of support by mid-April and a conditional 60 million euros earmarked specifically for the more than 350000 people living in Transnistria [27]. Later that month, the EU and Moldova separately reached political agreement on a much broader instrument: a 1.9-billion-euro Reform and Growth Facility, intended to fund Moldova’s wider economic reforms and its integration into the EU single market [28].
This is not the only transformation that could be seen in Transnistria in this period. Since 2022, fearing Russian attacks from the western front, Ukraine closed the border, putting under a commercial siege the small strip of land. This forced the Transnistrian economy to redirect its logistics chains, getting closer to the EU. In the first half of 2024, exports by Transnistrian companies to EU countries exceeded 80% of the total, while imports from Europe accounted for approximately 53% of the total [29]. And during 2025 the trend was not different. The products of the region’s metallurgic, textiles, and agricultural sectors are now mostly exported to member states like Romania, Poland and Italy [30].
To this situation it should be added the weak demography of the Pridnestrovian republic, that has seen its youth emigrate either west or to Russia (thanks to the Russian passport that half of the population in Transnistria has, given that the one issued by the breakaway republic is not recognised internationally and Putin on may 2026 have issued a decree that enabling all Transdnistria’s residents to obtain the Russian passport without meeting residence and other requirements [31]) to escape poverty or build a better life. Pensioners, who often receive Russian pensions [32], make up an increasingly significant part of the population (according to Moldovan authorities, people aged 60 and over account for around 28% of the total [1]) .
These two major events originating from the war in Ukraine reopened the debate on the reintegration of the republic into Moldova. For now, the European Union and Moldova treat the reintegration of the breakaway territory as something not to be imposed by force but as inevitable, and conditions are gradually being created for it to happen. In fact, Chișinău has adopted a dual strategy: on one side it has granted humanitarian support to the population with social assistance and energy, and on the other side, it maintained a firm line towards Tiraspol’s leadership, insisting that any future gas supplies must be at market rates, not as a political subsidy. The overall goal is to make the status of unrecognized country less and less sustainable, pushing therefore the attractiveness of the reintegration.
These conditions of course, even if they were actually created, do not indeed eliminate the Russian military presence in the area, which is probably the main factor that has enabled Tiraspol to remain independent over the last 30 years. Transnistria has survived until today mostly ignored, because solving the situation was considered by everyone more problematic than leaving everything as it is. But now, that it is almost at the epicenter of the chaos that has engulfed Eastern Europe, it is difficult to see a future where Tiraspol will not be affected profoundly. History is rarely merciful to those who are attached to the past and maybe for the last piece of the USSR the time has come to accept that the 21st century has arrived.
Edited by Adrian Kai Fraile Itagaki.
References
- Bureau for Reintegration Policies, Government of the Republic of Moldova. “Approximately 360 Thousand Residents of the Transnistrian Region Hold Citizenship of the Republic of Moldova.” gov.md,9 Jul 2026.
- CIEMEN/Nationalia. “Transnistria.” Nation profile, nationalia.info (results of the 2015 Transnistrian census).
- “Осада Приднестровья” [The Siege of Transnistria]. Sovershenno Sekretno, 9 Mar. 2016.
- “Портрет дня: Вадим Красносельский” [Portrait of the Day: Vadim Krasnoselsky]. Echo FM, [28 feb 2024].
- Pridnestrovian Republican Bank. “Денежные знаки Приднестровской Молдавской Республики” [Banknotes and Coins of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic], chronology. cbpmr.net.
- Miączyński, Piotr. “Mennica Polska bije monety dla Naddniestrza” [The Polish Mint Strikes Coins for Transnistria]. Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 Apr. 2006.
- “Приднестровье занялось чеканкой собственных копеек” [Transnistria Begins Minting Its Own Kopecks]. Lenta.ru, 18 Nov. 2005.
- “В Приднестровье начали хождение пластиковые разноцветные монеты” [Colourful Plastic Coins Enter Circulation in Transnistria]. Vedomosti, 22 Aug. 2014.
- “Пластиковые монеты ввели в обращение в Приднестровье” [Plastic Coins Introduced into Circulation in Transnistria]. NV.ua, 22 Aug. 2014.
- Giedroyc, Richard. “Plastic Newest Composition for Coins.” Numismatic News, 2014.
- “Chisinau Announced the Entire Command of the Russian Troops in Transnistria Persona Non Grata.” EADaily, 17 Apr. 2026.
- “Moldova’s Separatist Transdniester Claims ‘Drones Seen, Shots Fired’ Near Huge Ammo Depot.” RFE/RL, 2022.
- “Cobasna: Russia’s ‘MacGuffin’ Between Ukraine and NATO.” Balkan Insight, 20 Mar. 2023.
- Zavadska, Yuliia. “Moldova Declares Russian Troop Commanders Persona Non Grata.” Kyiv Post, 16 Apr. 2026.
- Socor, Vladimir. “Moldova’s National Security Strategy Designates Russia as Existential Threat, Europe as Destination (Part One).” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 13 Oct. 2023.
- “Moldova’s President Warns of Russian Interference Threat Ahead of Election.” Reuters, 30 July 2025.
- “Aleksandr Lukashenko illustra una piantina della guerra e sembra svelare i piani di Putin.” Rai News, 2 Mar. 2022.
- Sheriff Ltd. “About Company,” “The History of the Company,” and “Economic Effectiveness.” sheriff.md.
- “In Separatist Transnistria, Sheriff Calls the Shots.” AFP/France 24, 27 Sept. 2021.
- Cheban, Evgeny. “Moldova’s Window to Reintegrate Breakaway Transnistria Is Closing.” Carnegie Politika, 30 Oct. 2025.
- Leşanu, Alexandru. “Transnistria’s Presidential Election: A Hard-Fought Contest with No Punches Pulled.” EUROPP blog, London School of Economics, 23 Dec. 2016.
- Necșuțu, Mădălin. “Moldova’s Breakaway Transnistria Re-Elects Leader in Dubious Poll.” Balkan Insight, 13 Dec. 2021.
- Całus, Kamil. “Transnistrian Gas Crisis as Moscow’s Political Tool.” OSW Commentary, Nov. 2025.
- Polityuk, Pavel, and Tom Balmforth. “Thousands Left Without Heat or Gas in Moldova’s Pro-Russian Separatist Region.” Reuters, 7 Jan. 2025.
- Kovalenko, Nikita. “On Borrowed Time: How Transnistria Is Coping Without the Transit of Russian Gas via Ukraine.” Novaya Gazeta Europe, 24 Dec. 2025.
- Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. “The EU Offers Emergency Support to Tackle the Energy Crisis in Moldova.” European Commission, 27 Jan. 2025.
- European Commission. “European Commission and Moldova Agree on a 2-Year Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and Immediate Support with the Energy Bills.” 4 Feb. 2025.
- Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood. “Commission Welcomes Political Agreement on the €1.9 Billion Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova.” European Commission, 20 Feb. 2025.
- Government of the Republic of Moldova. “New Record: The Share of Exports from the Transnistrian Region… Amounted to More than 80%, and Imports – 53%.” 24 July 2024.
- Government of the Republic of Moldova. “Economic Agents from the Transnistrian Region Continue to Export Predominantly to the European Union Market.” 14 Jan. 2026.
- “Moldovan Leaders Decry Russian Move on Citizenship for Separatist Region.” Reuters, 17 May 2026.
- Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2021: Transnistria.
0 Comments
No comments yet. You can start the conversation below.