From Bandung to BRICS: A Bigger Seat or Another Table?

15 August 1945. Japan surrenders [1].

Almost six years of war have come to an end [1][2].

Millions of people are dead [3]. Empires are weakened [4]. Europe is shattered [4].

But, from the ruins, a new world order begins to take shape.

The devastating effects of the Second World War made one thing painfully clear: the international system that had fostered two world wars within a single generation should not simply be restored. The status quo was simply not an option. Even before Japan surrendered, governments across the world had already begun designing and kickstarting institutions that would prevent another catastrophe. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank owe their origins to the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 [5], and the United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco in June 1945 [6], establishing the framework for a new organisation dedicated to international peace and cooperation.

Yet, the organisations that were created to prevent wars still had sharp divisions of power within themselves. Each country was far from equal in terms of political and economic power. An example of this inequality can be found in the composition of the UN Security Council: five powers (China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), United Kingdom and the United States) received permanent seats and veto privileges [7], while a great part of Asia and Africa remained under colonial rule [8]. This example shows the paradox of the post-war world: indeed, the principle of sovereign equality existed alongside an institutional hierarchy that gave some countries considerably greater influence than others [6].

One of the very few positive impacts of the two World Wars was the acceleration of decolonisation; a major change that highlighted even more the imbalance between certain powers [8]. Many countries gained independence after nearly a century of colonial rule [8]. Newly independent countries were entering an international system whose foundations had largely been laid before they possessed the sovereignty to participate in shaping them. Their independence had changed their political status, but it had not necessarily given them an equal voice in the institutions governing international affairs.

In a way, the newly independent countries were still caged by diplomatic agreements and international institutions. Except this time, the cage was golden and shiny.

Most dark clouds have a silver lining. Nearly a decade later, the Third World found a way to organise and empower itself. Representatives of 29 Asian and African governments gathered in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955 [9]. They came together with one central question: after years of colonial subjugation, were they still prepared to be sandwiched between two competing superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union, which cared only about the race to the top?

The Bandung Conference was an attempt to establish a different place for Asian and African countries in international affairs. Its participants discussed colonialism, economic cooperation, sovereignty, and peaceful coexistence [9]. They did not agree on every issue, but they shared a determination to resist the continued domination [9]. And united, they stood tall and strong.

The question was no longer simply whether these countries were independent, but how much that independence meant in a world where political, military and economic power remained concentrated elsewhere.

Six years later, in 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement was formally established in Belgrade [10]. While Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement were not identical, they reflected a related ambition: countries should be able to pursue their own foreign policies without being compelled to align exclusively with either Cold War superpower [10][9].

What started in Bandung found a new form in Yekaterinburg. New players. New opponents. Same old question: who gets to decide how the world is run?

June 2009. Yekaterinburg, Russia [11][12].

Four countries. Brazil, Russia, India and China [12].

Different continents. Different political systems. Different interests.

Yet they came together to demand greater representation for emerging economies in international financial institutions and global decision-making [12].

BRIC had arrived on the world stage.

But unlike NATO, they had no collective enemy to defend against. Unlike the European Union, they had no ambition for political integration. They were not bound by geography, ideology or even friendship.

So what exactly brought them together?

And more importantly, will they survive?

At first glance, BRICS promises us a dream of a utopian world. The countries, at least on the surface, share a common vision for the world. Multipolar. Power distributed among several countries. Sovereign nations. Reformed international institutions. A perfect picture reflecting the changing world order [13].

But then, every dream comes to an end. We open our eyes and notice that the countries sitting on different sides of the table have very little in common, making unity a far-fetched dream.

Democracies coexist with authoritarian governments, emerging economies with established great powers, and countries maintaining close relationships with the West with those openly challenging it. Their political systems differ, their foreign policies frequently contradict one another, and even their understanding of what a multipolar world should look like is not necessarily the same.

Can democracies and dictatorships ever reach a common conclusion? The extreme right wing and the extreme left wing? Religious extremists and atheists? Is finding a common cause among these countries a futile attempt?

Perhaps history offers an explanation. After all, many of these countries share experiences of colonialism, foreign interference, and struggles for sovereignty.

“BRICS is an heir of the Non-Aligned Movement.”

— Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil, at the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 6 July 2025 [14].

It is an attractive comparison, particularly when we consider the demands for greater representation and independence that emerged from Bandung. But the comparison becomes complicated when we look at who is sitting around the table today.

India was colonised. China experienced foreign imperial domination. South Africa endured apartheid, while Brazil carries its own colonial history. Russia, however, was itself an empire. Today, China is one of the world’s most powerful countries, while India increasingly occupies the position of a major power in its own right.

Somewhere between Bandung and BRICS, the line between the oppressed and the oppressor became harder to draw. The contradictions do not end with history. They continue into the relationships between the very countries that make up BRICS.

Consider Russia and China. During the early years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the more powerful partner, providing China with economic, military and technological assistance. But ideological disagreements, competing national interests, and disputes over leadership of the communist world eventually fractured their relationship, culminating in the Sino-Soviet split [15]. Moscow was once Beijing’s elder brother. Then they became enemies. Then partners. And somewhere along the way, the younger brother grew taller. China’s extraordinary economic rise has fundamentally altered the balance between the two countries. Russia remains a major military and nuclear power, but its economic relationship with China has become increasingly asymmetric, particularly following Western sanctions imposed after its invasion of Ukraine [16]. What was once a relationship in which Moscow held the upper hand has evolved into one where Beijing possesses considerably greater economic leverage [16].

Symbiotic does not mean equal. And this raises an uncomfortable question for BRICS. How can a grouping that advocates a more equitable distribution of global power reconcile the growing inequalities within its own membership?

Keeping the inequalities aside, India and China reveal another serious problem: the absence of strategic trust. Their long-disputed border, nestled in the cold arms of the Himalayas, has witnessed repeated military confrontations over the decades, from the Sino-Indian War of 1962 to the more recent Galwan Valley clash of 2020 [17][18].

Border clashes are not their only issue. The Tibetan Plateau is the source of multiple rivers that flow into India, particularly the Brahmaputra, which serves as a lifeline for millions. Concerns have intensified as China has developed hydropower infrastructure upstream, in an ecologically sensitive region nestled in the embrace of the world’s highest mountains [19]. This, coupled with India’s decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama, who has lived in Dharamshala since 1960, adds another layer of tension to an already complicated relationship [20].

This becomes more complicated when Pakistan enters the equation. China either maintains a very close strategic and economic relationship with Pakistan, or Pakistan is yet another victim of China’s alleged debt-trap diplomacy [21][22]. India, meanwhile, has spent decades confronting security challenges arising from its relationship with Islamabad.

Pakistan’s bid to join BRICS presents another dilemma [21]. India may one day reconsider Islamabad’s bid, but the shadow of Rawalpindi has loomed over Pakistan for much of its existence [23].

Yet India and China continue to sit together in BRICS, discussing international cooperation while remaining strategic competitors outside of it. If they cannot fully trust one another on matters of national security, how much trust can they realistically extend to a common international institution? And then there is geography. Russia, China and India. Three giants sharing the vast Eurasian landmass. Centuries of trade, conflict and rivalry, shaped by their proximity.

But Brazil and South Africa?

Continents apart. Oceans between them. Almost outsiders in an already unlikely coalition. Is distance a blessing or a curse? Perhaps the ancient Indian political thinker Kautilya offers an explanation. His Mandala theory of foreign relations, developed in the Arthashastra, treats neighbouring rulers as potential adversaries and the neighbours of those adversaries as potential allies [24]. Geography, in this view, shapes both the opportunities for cooperation and the possibilities of conflict.

If this reasoning holds, the distance between Brazil and South Africa could actually be an advantage. They do not share the same immediate territorial rivalries that complicate relations between India and China. Yet distance also creates different regional priorities, economic dependencies, and security concerns. A crisis in South Asia may not carry the same urgency in Brasília or Pretoria. Their presence gives BRICS a global geographical reach, but does that automatically translate into political unity?

Perhaps we have been looking for similarities in the wrong places. What if BRICS was never meant to be a gathering of friends, neighbours or countries sharing the same ideology? What if what brings them together is not what they believe in, but what they are dissatisfied with?

The demand for greater representation has remained a recurring theme since the first BRIC summit in 2009 [11]. Emerging economies have long questioned why institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank continue to reflect historical distributions of power despite significant changes in the global economy [13]. India and Brazil have sought greater influence in international decision-making, while China and Russia have also supported reforms to aspects of global economic governance [12][13].

Interestingly, this dissatisfaction is not confined to BRICS. Finnish President Alexander Stubb has argued that emerging powers deserve greater influence in international institutions, recognising that the existing system must adapt to changing global realities [25][26]. Perhaps they agree that the world cannot continue to be governed as though its balance of power has remained unchanged since 1945.

But don’t Russia and China already hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council, complete with veto powers? [7]

Perhaps BRICS has grown tired of asking for a bigger seat at the table and has decided to build another one altogether.

The establishment of the New Development Bank in 2014 suggests that this ambition is not entirely rhetorical [27]. Created to finance infrastructure and sustainable development, the bank had approved approximately $43 billion across 139 projects by the end of 2025 [28]. Whatever disagreements exist among BRICS members, they have demonstrated an ability to establish and operate a common financial institution.

This is important because an argument about BRICS’s possible failure cannot simply ignore what it has already achieved. The New Development Bank offers an additional source of development finance, and its activities demonstrate that cooperation can extend beyond summit declarations. However, creating another development bank is not the same as replacing the international financial system. BRICS members continue to participate in the IMF, World Bank, and existing financial markets. They maintain substantial economic relationships with Western countries, and their approaches to reducing dollar dependence differ. The debate surrounding a common BRICS currency illustrates this problem. While local-currency trade and alternative payment arrangements could provide greater financial flexibility, a genuine common currency would require far deeper monetary coordination [13]. Whose monetary policy would prevail? Who would control its institutions? And would countries seeking independence from one financial hierarchy willingly accept another?

The absence of a common currency does not necessarily indicate failure, but it does expose the difficulties of pursuing collective financial ambitions without a willingness to surrender national discretion.

And these difficulties are not merely hypothetical.

In May 2026, BRICS foreign ministers gathered in New Delhi but failed to issue a joint statement because of disagreements concerning the Middle East [29]. The meeting instead produced a chair’s statement [29]. Countries capable of agreeing on the importance of a more representative international order could not reach agreement on how to respond collectively to a major geopolitical crisis.

The contrast is revealing. BRICS can establish a development bank and coordinate economic initiatives, yet its members can struggle to agree when questions of foreign policy collide with competing national interests.

Perhaps there is another explanation for why they remain together despite these contradictions. Strategic autonomy. Simply put, the freedom of a country to make its own decisions, pursue its own interests and choose its own allies without being dictated to by another power. It does not necessarily mean neutrality, nor does it mean hostility towards the West. A country can cooperate with Washington on one issue, Beijing on another and Moscow on a third. Agree with one. Disagree with another. All without pledging unquestionable loyalty to either.

The idea is simple. Cooperate where interests align, disagree where they don’t, and never surrender the freedom to choose. India provides perhaps the clearest example. It participates in BRICS alongside China and Russia while cooperating with the United States, Japan and Australia through the Quad [30]. Brazil maintains relationships with Western economies while demanding greater representation for emerging powers [13]. The United Arab Emirates combines longstanding security relations with the United States and participation in BRICS [31][29].

What appears contradictory under the traditional logic of alliances begins to make more sense when viewed through strategic autonomy. Perhaps these countries do not want to replace one exclusive alignment with another. They want more choices, more relationships and greater freedom to decide for themselves.

In that sense, something of Bandung’s original ambition remains recognisable. The countries have changed, the balance of power has shifted, and some of those once subjected to foreign domination have become powerful themselves. Yet the desire to preserve freedom of action continues.

Strategic autonomy may therefore explain why BRICS members remain together despite their differences. But it may also explain why the grouping struggles to move beyond them.

Consider NATO. Established in 1949 against the backdrop of growing confrontation with the Soviet Union, the alliance developed a system of collective defence supported by permanent institutions, military coordination and treaty obligations [32]. Under Article 5, an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all, with each member committed to taking such action as it deems necessary [33].

Yet NATO’s survival cannot be explained by a common enemy alone. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, but NATO continued [32]. Its members have disagreed on wars, foreign policy and national priorities, but the alliance possesses institutional mechanisms and commitments that endure beyond individual disagreements [32].

BRICS operates differently. It has no collective-defence obligation, no supranational government and no binding common foreign policy. Its members cooperate through consultation and consensus, retaining considerable independence over their individual decisions [13].

Of course, BRICS is not NATO, nor was it created to perform the same functions. But the comparison reveals an important distinction between maintaining an organisation and enabling it to act collectively. NATO’s members have accepted certain obligations to one another [33]. BRICS members have generally avoided commitments that would significantly constrain their national freedom of action. That flexibility makes cooperation among rivals possible, but it also limits how much authority the grouping can exercise when those rivals disagree.

Expansion complicates matters further. Every new member increases BRICS’s economic weight, geographical reach and potential diplomatic influence. But every new member also brings additional interests, rivalries and priorities into a system dependent on consensus [29][13].

How many contradictions can a grouping accommodate before its flexibility becomes paralysis?

Perhaps BRICS will continue to expand, establish institutions and offer its members additional opportunities for cooperation. Its continued existence should not be confused with its ability to act as a unified geopolitical force. A forum can remain relevant without becoming an alliance, just as an organisation can survive without fulfilling every ambition associated with it.

However, if BRICS intends to become a meaningful alternative to the existing international order, it may eventually have to ask its members for something they have been reluctant to surrender: a part of their independence. And this is the contradiction at the heart of BRICS. The freedom that allows its members to cooperate despite their differences may also prevent them from developing the collective authority necessary to overcome those differences.

Perhaps BRICS was never trying to choose between demanding a bigger seat at the old table and building another one. Perhaps it was simply trying to ensure that its members retained the freedom to sit at both.

But sharing a table and agreeing on what happens around it are two very different things.

And so, we return to the question with which we began.

Why does BRICS survive? Strategic autonomy.

What limits BRICS? Strategic autonomy.

Will BRICS survive? Time will tell.

Edited by Maria Antonietta Fiocchi.

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[Cover picture]: Leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China at the first BRIC summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, 16 June 2009. Photograph: Presidential Press and Information Office, Kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY 4.0.

[Second image] New Development Bank headquarters, Shanghai, China. Photograph by Donnie28, via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.