Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias meeting Aguila Saleh, then speaker of Libya’s eastern parliament, in July 2020.
On 20 October 2026, Eastern Libya’s House of Representatives reversed its previous position on the maritime memorandum signed in 2019 by Turkey and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) [1]. Eastern Libyan authorities rejected the agreement, while Greece and Egypt objected to its maritime claims [1][2]. The EU also opposed the memorandum [2]. In 2020, the House had decided to reject the memorandums signed by the GNA with Turkey, and to break off political relations with Ankara [1]. The vote strengthened Turkey’s diplomatic position and shifted the politics inside Libya, but it did not change the legal status of the maritime line for Greece, Egypt or the EU [1][2].
I. What Changed in Libya, and Why Now?
Turkey’s military support helped the GNA repel the 2019 Khalifa Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli[3]. At the time, the eastern Libyan House of Representatives rejected the Turkey–Libya agreement [1]. Libya’s political divisions have persisted since Muammar Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011[3].
According to eastern Libyan lawmaker Aisha al-Tabalqi, the agreement was approved after specialised parliamentary committees explained its provisions in detail [1]. Tarek al-Jeroushi, another MP in support of the deal, justified his stand by referring to the national interest of Libya as well as its possible advantages for politics, economy, and security [1].
Both in 2022 and 2023, President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had a number of meetings with Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the eastern parliament[4]. The Turkish intelligence chief, İbrahim Kalın, also held contacts with Khalifa Haftar and his son, Saddam, in 2025 and 2026, respectively [5][6]. Turkey, in the meantime, increased its diplomatic, military, and economic ties with eastern Libya while maintaining relations with the western part of the country [3][5][6].
The reason why the parliament changed its position in October is not fully clear. Turkey’s growing contacts with eastern Libya probably played a part [5][6]. According to Middle East Eye, quoting a source from Libya, Haftar was behind Saleh’s removal as speaker in October, following months of negotiations between Ankara and Haftar [7]. Since Saleh had rejected the memorandum in 2019, his removal may have meant that a significant impediment to the approval of the document had been removed [7].
II. Importance of Setting Maritime Boundaries
On 27 November 2019, Turkey and the GNA signed the Memorandum of Understanding regarding maritime delimitation in Istanbul [8]. It became operational on 8 December 2019 and was registered with the UN on 11 December 2019 [8]. The objective of the document was to establish maritime boundaries of jurisdiction of the two states [8].
Three legal concepts help explain the dispute. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) can be described as the zone beyond the territorial sea where the state exercises its sovereign rights in relation to the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources, both living and non-living [9]. The continental shelf includes the seabed and the subsoil areas beyond the territorial sea where the country can explore and exploit resources within the limits of international law [10]. Maritime delimitation is the process of drawing boundary lines where maritime claims overlap [10].
Greece strongly criticised Turkey’s proposed delimitation, which it considered contrary to the maritime rights of Greek islands such as Crete, Rhodes, Karpathos, and Kasos [11]. Turkey claimed that there should be an equitable maritime boundary taking geographical considerations and coastline relations into consideration [12].
Greece and Egypt delimited their own maritime zones in August 2020 [13]. The GNA objected to that agreement, while supporting its own memorandum with Turkey [3].
The fact that the memorandum was signed and registered with the UN does not, however, settle the dispute under international law [2][8]. Registration does not establish that an agreement is legally valid against third states [2][8]. Turkey is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while Greece is [11][12]. Article 121 of UNCLOS deals with the entitlements of islands regarding maritime matters, while boundary delimitation in the matter of overlapping maritime claims is a different issue of international law [14][10].
The European Union has likewise kept its stance against the memorandum [2]. In December 2019, the European Council stood in solidarity with Greece and Cyprus [2]. In January 2020, Charles Michel, president of the European Council, stated the European Union’s stance that the memorandum violated the sovereign rights of third parties and would not have any legal effects upon them [15].
To understand the economic interests behind this development, reference should also be made to another agreement that Turkey has concluded with Libya. In 2022, Turkey and Libya entered into a hydrocarbons agreement for cooperation, with TPAO, the state-owned oil company of Turkey, seeking cooperation with the National Oil Corporation of Libya [16]. In February 2026, TPAO gained interests in onshore Block C3 through cooperation with Repsol of Spain, and in offshore Block O7 with Repsol and MOL of Hungary [17].
The vote in the Libyan parliament did not grant Turkey new drilling licences [1][17]. What matters is the new political environment that this decision may create for future maritime cooperation and energy cooperation between the two countries.
III. Does This Change the Mediterranean Balance of Power?
For Turkey, the parliamentary reversal represents a diplomatic gain [1]. While Ankara continues to maintain good relations with western Libya, its contacts with eastern Libya have increasingly strengthened in recent years [3][5][6].
The parliament’s reversal is, however, far from sufficient to allow Turkey to exercise unilateral control over eastern Libya. The rejection of the agreement by Greece and the EU still stands [2][18]. Greece’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already rejected the decision and continues to assert the invalidity of the memorandum [18].
A note of caution is also warranted concerning the position Egypt may adopt following this significant development in the Eastern Mediterranean. Egypt objected to the 2019 memorandum and delimited its maritime zones with Greece in 2020 [12][13]. Egypt’s foreign policy will probably keep being shaped by its relationships with Greece and eastern Libya.
This development was welcomed by the Foreign Ministry of the Government of National Unity in Tripoli and by Presidential Council deputy, Musa al-Koni [19][20]. Nevertheless, agreement on one issue does not mean that all of Libya’s political and institutional disputes have been solved [3].
For the European Union, there is a risk of additional friction, as eastern Libya’s reversal of its rejection of the memorandum remains at odds with the EU’s opposition to the agreement [2][18]. A vote alone has not so far been enough to spark a confrontation at sea, and for now only political consequences are likely.
Conclusion: What Has Changed, and What Remains Uncertain?
The eastern Libyan parliament’s backing of the 2019 Turkey–Libya maritime memorandum is politically important for Turkey and could lead to more Turkish diplomatic and energy cooperation with Libya [1][5][6]. However, it does not resolve the maritime disagreement [2][18].
Greece, Egypt, along with the EU maintain their objections, and the vote creates no new boundary binding on third countries [2][12][18]. Whether Turkey’s rapprochement with eastern Libya will lead to a wider realignment in the Eastern Mediterranean, or will have only limited practical effects, remains to be seen.
Edited by Maria Antonietta Fiocchi.
References
[4] Presidency of Türkiye (2022; 2023) – Erdoğan’s meetings with Aguila Saleh. 2022:
[5] The National (2025) – Turkish spy chief holds rare meetings with Libya’s Haftar in Benghazi.
[6] Anadolu Agency (2026) – Turkish intelligence chief meets Libyan commander Saddam Haftar.
[9] United Nations – UNCLOS, Part V: Exclusive Economic Zone, Articles 55–57.
[10] United Nations – UNCLOS, Part VI: Continental Shelf, Articles 76–83.
[14] United Nations – UNCLOS, Article 121: Regime of Islands.
[17] Anadolu Agency (2026) – Türkiye’s TPAO wins two blocks in Libya’s oil and gas licensing round.
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